Trust in Politics: The Effects of Stealing Thunder

Katelyn H Jones

A report submitted as a partial requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Psychological Sciences with Honours in Psychology at the University of Tasmania, 2016.

Statement of Sources

"I declare that this report is my own original work and that contributions of others have been duly acknowledged."

Signed: _____

Date: _____

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my Grandma, Valarie Chellis, and Opa, Bruno Kruger.

We will always love and miss you both.

Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Jim Sauer, for his constant guidance, encouragement and brilliance throughout the year. Thank you for taking on the role of being my supervisor, despite being based on different campus' and not knowing who I was before this year. I have appreciated your humour, patience, and prompt replies to emails.

I am genuinely appreciative of all the time you have spent helping me, and for providing me with opportunities that I am incredibly grateful for.

Thank you.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Trust in Politics: The Effects of Stealing Thunder

Katelyn H Jones

Word count: 9,981

Abstract

In this study, we investigated the effects of stealing thunder (a type of self-disclosure) and type of transgression (competence vs. integrity) on trust in a politician and their representative party and policy, after the politician commits a transgression. 99 participants (68 females, 31 males) with an average age of 30.89 (SD=14.12) completed this study, with just over half (62.2%) being students University of Tasmania. Participants complete an online survey where they read several vignettes about a hypothetical politician committing a wrongdoing, and completed Likert scales and dichotomous measures of support in the politician, their party and policy. A trend in results was identified across some measures, where ratings of support were higher post-transgression when the wrongdoing was related to the politician's competence. Furthermore, regression analysis established trust as a full mediator of support in a politician. It was concluded that people are more forgiving of a politician when the transgression they commit is related to their competence, as opposed to their integrity. Stealing thunder could be effective in a political setting, however contextual factors may distort this effectiveness.

Imagine a hypothetical Australian politician, Scott Stevens. Stevens recently evaded Australian taxes through opening an offshore bank account with a Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca. This is a crime potentially punishable by gaol time. Recently, the media have released the names of other important persons who have also opened offshore accounts with this firm. Names include politicians such as Donald Trump and Malcolm Turnbull. 11.5 million documents – dubbed the Panama Papers – have been leaked, and Stevens fears that his name (a) is likely to be included in these documents and (b) might soon be released by the media. Regardless of whether others opened these off-shore accounts with intentions of evading taxes, this was Stevens' intention. He understands he has done the wrong thing, however still wants to hold his position in federal politics and happens to have a new policy proposal he was about to release. What might Stevens do to mitigate the consequences of his transgression on voter support? From an alternative perspective, how might Stevens' actions following his transgression influence potential voters' beliefs and behaviours? If there was a way of lessening negative consequences of one's actions, it could have fundamental implications for the functioning of democratic systems of government.

One tactic potentially capable of moderating the negative consequences of Stevens' actions on voter support is *stealing thunder*. In essence, stealing thunder is the act of revealing unflattering or incriminating information about oneself before it is released by a third party: Effectively, stealing someone else's thunder. It is a strategy commonly utilized by politicians, celebrities, and other individuals in the public spotlight. For example, Maria Sharapova, a well-known tennis player, recently held a press conference confessing that she had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that only recently became illegal. The key point being that *she* held this

conference *before* the media could release the information. By stealing thunder, the individual hopes to be perceived as upfront and honest, potentially lessening the impact of the negative information. Another example is that of Bill Clinton famously acknowledging in his 1992 presidential campaign that he once smoked marijuana, but did not inhale. Whether this was a slip of the tongue, or a well-thought out comment, it could be perceived as stealing thunder as he declared he had taken drugs before another party (e.g., the media or his Republican opponent) could reveal this potentially damaging information. Although these examples illustrate attempts to steal thunder in applied settings, the effectiveness of the technique in these scenarios cannot be determined. In this study we aimed to determine the effectiveness of stealing thunder as a trust restoration/preservation technique following a transgression in a political setting.

Stealing Thunder

Stealing thunder is a persuasion strategy with a strong grounding in psychological research. It is a strategy used primarily in court wherein the defense discloses negative information before the prosecutor can: In effect, lessening the impact of the damaging information in the eyes of the jury (Howard, Brewer & Williams, 2006; Williams, Bourgeois & Croyle, 1993). This self-disclosure acts as a statement against self-interest, increasing the credibility of the defendant and leading the jury to perceive the information as less negative and, potentially, less incriminating (Dolnik, Case & Williams, 2003; Williams et al., 1993). Stealing thunder is considered a very effective manipulation strategy, and has been utilized in court settings for many years. However, Williams et al. provided the first empirical evidence of the practical effects of stealing thunder.

Williams et al. (1993) had 257 psychology students read or listen to a reenactment of an 18-page trial transcript. Participants were exposed to one of three versions of the trial transcript: thunder, no thunder, and stealing thunder. In the thunder condition only the prosecutor presented the negative information: that the defendant had repeatedly physically abused another. This information was omitted in the no thunder (control) condition, and the stealing thunder condition described a situation wherein the defense presented the negative information (repeated assaults) about themselves prior to the prosecutor repeating that information. Participants either read or listened to one of the conditions, and rated the likely guilt of the defendant on an 11-point Likert scale. Further questions probed the perceived credibility of the parties involved. Probability of guilt scores were significantly higher in the thunder than the stolen thunder condition, and stealing thunder produced marginally higher ($p < .08$, $d = 0.22$) defendant convincingness ratings than thunder. Path analysis confirmed that stealing thunder increased perceived credibility of both the defendant and the defense attorney, hence affecting judgments of guilt. The authors concluded that stealing thunder was an effective persuasion strategy, operating via effects on the perceived credibility of the defendant and defense attorney.

Williams et al.'s (1993) conclusions are certainly consistent with broader literature on impression management and persuasion. Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken (1978) demonstrated that increased credibility leads to increased persuasiveness. Furthermore, other studies (e.g., Archer & Burleson, 1980) have shown that people are perceived as more likeable when they present negative information about themselves earlier in an interaction rather than later. It has been hypothesised that the timing of the disclosure of negative information and prior reputation or beliefs of the

person or party may also influence the effectiveness of stealing thunder (Archer & Burleson, 1980; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Williams et al.). For example, Collins and Miller's (1994) meta-analytic review suggested that people might develop more positive beliefs about those who disclose information about themselves, leading them to be perceived as more likeable. Additionally, if a person discloses personal information to another, the recipient of the information may feel important, as if they have been specifically chosen to know the information. Being 'singled' out in such a manner can act as a positive social reward, leading the discloser to be perceived as likeable (Collins & Miller). Disclosing this information sooner rather than later in an interaction establishes this impression early in a potential relationship, deeming the discloser as more upfront, honest, and potentially persuasive (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen; Williams et al.). Thus, in a court setting, these perceptions or impressions of the discloser (defendant) may influence jurors' perceptions of the negative information itself, subsequently presented evidence and, ultimately, their perceptions of defendant culpability.

Since Williams et al.'s (1993) original study, further research demonstrated that stealing thunder was no longer effective if the jury knew it was being utilized as a manipulation strategy (Dolnik et al., 2003). This finding – that stealing thunder loses its potency if participants perceive that they are being manipulated – is consistent across the domains in which stealing thunder has been investigated. Dolnik et al. suggests jurors are able to correct their perceptions and are motivated to do so when they were made aware that a manipulation strategy was being used. Therefore, they are no longer susceptible to the strategy, in this case, stealing thunder. In an alternative context, those who utilize stealing thunder as a statement against self-interest are perceived as more honest despite the potential personal cost

of the information (Williams et al.). However, if it becomes known that they are stealing thunder in an attempt to manipulate people's perceptions, the initial positive connotation is replaced by a negative one, and hence stealing thunder loses its effectiveness (Dolnik et al).

Williams et al. (1993) demonstrated that stealing thunder is effective through increasing perceived credibility. However, their study was limited to simulated criminal and civil trials. Nonetheless, Williams et al. suggested stealing thunder should be applicable to other settings such as interpersonal relationships and politics. Ondrus and Williams and Ondrus (as cited in Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005) provided evidence that stealing thunder by politicians can influence voter intent, cause a decrease in the amount negative media releases post-stealing thunder, and lessen the degree of negative information in these media releases. However, these studies were not published and the literature is scarce. Nevertheless, stealing thunder has been found to be an effective method for reducing the impact of negative information in areas such as community and organization crises management, and business (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Claeys, Cauberghe & Leysen, 2013; Fennis & Stroebe, 2014). For example, Fennis and Stroebe found that self-disclosure (stealing thunder) influenced consumers' judgements and behaviours, leading them to choose the self-disclosing company's products over those of an opposing company. The authors argued this was because intention to engage in trusting behaviour (buying a company's product) was determined by consumer beliefs about the company, and self-disclosure promoted positive beliefs.

Trust

Mayer, Davis and Shoorman (1995) defined trust as "The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party". They further explain that trust in a person or party is based on beliefs about the competence and integrity of that person or party. In the context of trust, competence is defined as the perception that a person has the skills and knowledge required to fulfill their responsibility, and integrity is defined as behaving in a way that conforms to the rules deemed by a trustor as appropriate in a particular setting (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995). This is explained by Mayer et al.'s model of trust (See Appendix A). The model has been compared to the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970), as people's intentions to engage in a particular behaviour predict their willingness to engage in the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). According to this model, intention to partake in a trusting behaviour is determined by the perceived integrity and competence of the trustee, where trusting behaviour requires taking a risk. Trusting beliefs are compromised when there is a perceived lack of competence or integrity (Fishbein & Ajzen). Essentially, when trusting another involves some risk to ourselves, our willingness to trust will depend on our perceptions of the others abilities and their integrity. If our perception is that someone lacks ability or integrity, then our trust in them will be compromised.

If these trusting intentions and behaviours occur similarly in different settings, then the use of self-disclosure could promote trusting behaviours in different settings. Self-disclosure has been shown to promote positive, trusting beliefs, therefore stealing thunder as a specific type of self-disclosure could potentially increase perceived trust. It could be beneficial to utilize trust theories and measures of trust in stealing thunder research. Furthermore, measuring trust beliefs and utilizing stealing thunder as a type of self-disclosure could be applied in a political

setting (as suggested by Williams et al.), where stealing thunder produces more trusting beliefs and behaviours towards a politician.

Stealing Thunder and Trust in a Political Setting

Stealing thunder, and utilizing theories of trust, could potentially be applied to politics, where trusting in a politician could facilitate voting behavior (or even other forms of political support, e.g., political donations), depending on the perceived competence and integrity of the politician. Williams et al. (1993) suggested that stealing thunder should be applicable in the political domain utilizing the same mechanisms underlying its efficacy in criminal settings, such as increasing perceived credibility of the transgressor. Additionally, it could be valuable to test trust, as measures of trust have not yet been tested in stealing thunder research in a political setting. In this case of measuring trust, we manipulated perceived integrity and competence of a politician and type of disclosure (i.e., stealing thunder versus thunder) after a hypothetical politician committed a transgression. This was to assess the effects of stealing thunder for trust restoration in a politician, their party and specific policy.

Trust Restoration Following a Transgression

Previous studies looking at the application of self-disclosure in repairing trust after a violation – largely in organizational contexts – have tested the effect of type of incident/transgression and the response of the potential transgressor on trust restoration (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper & Dirks, 2004). Kim et al. tested whether participants, who assumed the role of a manager, would hire a tax accountant after this accountant had committed either an integrity- or competence-based transgression. In this scenario, the integrity-based transgression detailed an event where the accountant intentionally filed an incorrect tax return, and the competence-

based transgression was one where the accountant incorrectly filed a tax return due to inadequate knowledge. Participants watched a video of an interview between a recruiter and the applicant for the job. The recruiter brought up a recent transgression committed by the prospective employee, and the prospective employee either apologized or denied the accusation.

An apology is a statement wherein responsibility and guilt for a decision, specifically a breach in trust, is acknowledged. Alternatively, denial of an allegation is a statement where the accusation is rejected and declared to be false (Kim et al., 2004). Recognizing, acknowledging, and taking responsibility for a decision where trust was violated (cf. denying responsibility), can facilitate trust repair (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Despite being a declaration of guilt, an apology implies a sense of regret or remorse, further implying that the party will not commit another violation of trust in the future, and consequently facilitating trust restoration (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1978; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). However, apologizing is only beneficial for certain types of transgression. For example, apologizing is effective for competence-based transgressions as it implies regret or remorse and a desire for redemption, however apologizing for integrity-based transgressions does not imply remorse, as the transgression is a reflection of the party's character (Kim et al.). Additionally, apologizing is only effective in a situation where the benefits outweigh the costs, such as potential redemption outweighing corroboration of guilt. Essentially, apologizing is only effective when the party may have been found guilty regardless of whether they apologized or not. If there was no evidence to suggest their guilt, apologizing may be unnecessary and cause previously avoidable negative consequences. Overall, this is consistent with the effects of stealing thunder, where

the effectiveness of the disclosure strategy depends on the benefits of revealing the negative information versus the consequences of disclosing irrelevant negative information (Williams et al., 1993).

Kim et al. (2004) had participants complete trust belief and trust intention measures through several multi-item scales measuring perceived integrity, competence, willingness to risk, likelihood of hiring, and job responsibility of the applicant. For the competence-based transgression, trust beliefs and intentions were repaired more successfully when the applicant apologized. However, for integrity-based transgressions, trust beliefs and intentions were repaired more successfully when the applicant denied accountability for an allegation of guilt. This study suggests a difference in the way trust is restored for integrity versus competence related violations, based on the Trust Repair Model (TRM; Kim et al. 2004) (See Appendix B). The TRM explains that trust restoration is result of perceived competence and integrity, which can depend on violation type (integrity versus competence) and response to violation (apology versus denial). Kim et al. found that trust is restored more successfully when a person apologizes for a competence related transgression, and denies guilt for an integrity related transgression. This is based on the schematic model of dispositional attribution, a model that explains that individuals view negative information about integrity as more important than positive information about integrity. Conversely, individuals view negative information about competence as less important than positive information about competence (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Snyder & Stukas Jr, 1999). This is further explained by hierarchically-restricted schemas, the concept that acting on one extreme of a continuum will be restricting on behaviour, whilst acting on the other extreme will not (Reeder and Brewer, 1979). For example, one good performance at

a job can demonstrate a high level of competence, as it is assumed that someone with low competency would not have been able to perform in such a way. Additionally, a person with high competence may still perform poorly in certain situations. However, the opposite is true for integrity, where one breach of integrity suggests the person is dishonest and is considered a reliable sign they have low integrity. Despite demonstrating high integrity at another time, they still have the potential to behave in a dishonest way. Relating this to literature on trust restoration, when a person apologizes after committing a competence-related transgression, despite the fact they are admitting guilt, the incident may be perceived as a mistake, also implying that the person is willing to redeem themselves. However, apologizing for an integrity-related transgression implies guilt and a lack of integrity. Since negative information about integrity is valued more highly, it is hence more difficult to change these perceptions once a violation of integrity has occurred (Kim et al., Madon, Jussim & Eccles, 1997; Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight & Jakobs, 1992).

Other studies have replicated Kim et al.'s (2004) findings (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper & Dirks, 2007; Haesevoets, Folmer and Van Hiel, 2015; Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2009; Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006) further reiterating research conducted by Madon, Jussim and Eccles (1997) and Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight and Jakobs (1992) demonstrating differences in how trust is restored following a transgression. Therefore, given the robust differences in the literature between trust-restoration (using varied restoration methods) following competence- versus integrity-based transgression, there is reason to suspect that the effects of stealing thunder on trust restoration following competence versus integrity related transgressions in political settings might vary.

Stealing Thunder as a Manipulation Strategy

In previous research, stealing thunder has been identified as a method to reduce the negative consequences of one's actions (Williams et al., 1993). However, stealing thunder could be perceived and utilized in two very different ways. Stealing thunder could be utilized in a situation where a party has committed a transgression and genuinely seeks a redemption of trust via an admission of guilt and an act of contrition, or it could be utilized as a manipulation strategy in which the sole aim is to minimize the personal consequences of their transgression. In the latter scenario, stealing thunder may be conceptualized as an attempt to purposely manipulate individuals' perceptions to maintain perceived credibility. For example, a politician may purposefully commit a transgression knowing the consequences, and utilize stealing thunder as a manipulation strategy in an effort to minimize any loss of credibility or trust among voters. In the current research, we conceptualize stealing thunder primarily as a way to restore trust after a transgression, as situations may arise in political scenarios where a transgression is committed and it is of the utmost importance that the politician maintain or restore the trust of the public to ensure their vote. However, it is worth bearing in mind that those would steal thunder are not necessarily pure in motive.

Current Research

It is important to test the effectiveness of stealing thunder as a method of trust restoration in a political setting, and to understand if and how the efficacy of this technique varies as a function of transgression type. Furthermore, in the political domain, it is important to determine not just whether stealing thunder affects trust restoration for the implicated individual following a transgression, but whether any effects carry over to influence perceptions of the political party to which the individual belongs, and to policies the individual supports. Thus, we obtained

measures of the likelihood of people voting for the politician after they have committed a wrongdoing, and measures of support for the political party and a specific policy championed by the transgressor. The literature suggests that people's pre-existing socio-political affiliations and beliefs can influence how people make trusting decisions towards politicians (Carlin & Love, 2013). Therefore, to control for potential moderating effects relating to socio-political ideology, we had participants complete Kahan et al.'s (2012) worldview scale and included this as a covariate in initial analyses.

This research determined whether stealing thunder is an effective method of trust restoration in a political setting. We also established the effect of stealing thunder on support for the political party and policies represented by the transgressor. Furthermore, we investigated how type of transgression, whether integrity or competence related, influences the effects of stealing thunder and trust restoration in the political context. Based on previous research (e.g. Dolnik et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Williams et al., 1993), we hypothesised that stealing thunder (cf. a thunder only condition) would reduce the impact of negative information on support for a politician following a transgression in a political setting. Consistent with previous work on trust restoration, we also hypothesized that stealing thunder would be more effective for competence-based transgressions than integrity-based transgressions. Furthermore, we explored the knock-on effects of a political transgression on support for party and policy, looking at whether stealing thunder effectively restores, or prevents, loss of support for a party and policy. We predicted that these effects would be similar to those for the individual politician.

Method

Design

We used a 2(Transgression: Integrity- vs. Competence-based) x 2(Thunder: Stealing Thunder vs. Thunder) x2(Time of measure: pre- vs. post-disclosure) mixed design, with time of measure as the within-participant variable. The transgression was tax evasion committed by a hypothetical politician, where the evasion was either intentional (integrity-based) or reflected a lack of knowledge on the politician's part (competence-based). In the stealing thunder condition, participants read a hypothetical press statement from the politician about the transgression. Alternatively, in the thunder condition, participants read a hypothetical media release, in the form of a newspaper article, about the transgression. The primary dependent variables measured were support (using continuous and categorical scales) for the politician, party and their policy. Ratings of support were obtained at two time points: After participants read a biography of the hypothetical politician, and after they read the disclosure of the transgression (i.e., before and after the participant read either the press release or newspaper article). We also assessed participants' socio-political affiliations, participants' knowledge and the degree to which they care about politics and their perceptions of manipulation as screening measures.

Participants

A total of 102 people participated in this study. Of this, three participants' data were removed, leaving a total of 99 (68 females, 31 males) participants. Of these, 62.6% were students at the University of Tasmania. The average age was 30.89 (SD=14.12), with a minimum of age 18 and maximum age of 80. First year psychology students received course credit for their participation. Other participants

were offered a chance to win one of two $50 Coles/Myer vouchers as an incentive. Data was collected through online testing using lime survey.

Materials

Biography. The materials for this study consisted of a brief biography introducing participants to Senator Scott Stevens, a hypothetical Tasmanian politician (See Appendix C). It provided information on his personal and political background, the party he represents and a policy he supports. Explicit information about the fictitious politician's political affiliations was not conveyed.

Policy statement. A policy statement followed the biography and detailed a new policy proposal the hypothetical politician had planned (See Appendix D). The policy was written to be as politically neutral as possible, so as not to identify the politician with a certain affiliation.

Disclosure. Information about a recent transgression that Scott Stevens had committed was detailed in four vignettes, with each vignette describing one of the four between-participants conditions of the experiment. The first vignette described a transgression relating to Stevens' integrity and was presented as a newspaper article (thunder) (See Appendix E). The second vignette described an integrity-related transgression in the form of a press release (stealing thunder) (See Appendix F). The third vignette was another newspaper article detailing a transgression related to competence (See Appendix G), and the final vignette detailed a competence-related transgression in the form of a press release (See Appendix H). Each vignette described the same incident, the only differences being the point of view from which it was presented and whether the transgression was framed as competence or integrity-based. The transgression Stevens committed was tax evasion through

opening an offshore bank account with the Mossack Fonseca law firm, and hence an association with the Panama Papers.

Measures. A series of 7-point Likert scales assessed the participant's support in the individual (e.g., *How trustworthy is Scott Stevens?* Where 1= not at all trustworthy and 7= extremely trustworthy) (See Appendix I). Additional scaled measures were obtained asking about support in the politician's party and to what degree participants' cared and were knowledgeable about politics (See Appendix J). Some items measured on 7-point Likert scales were adapted from items from Kim et al.'s (2004) study measuring perceived integrity (items 4, 5 and 6), perceived competence (items 1, 2 and 3), willingness to risk (items 7, 8 and 9, where item 9 was reverse scored), hiring and job responsibilities (10, 11, 12 and 13) (See Appendix K). Several dichotomous questions assessed the participant's support for the politician, their party and the policy (e.g., *Would you support/vote for this politician?*) (See Appendix L). Additional dichotomous questions asked the participants if they believed the politician utilized any manipulation strategies, and if so, what they were (See Appendix M). Participants completed Kahan et al.'s (2012) scale, measuring participants' ideological worldviews (i.e., assessing hierarchical-individualist vs. egalitarian-collectivist worldviews) (See Appendix N). Items 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 represented individualistic items, and items 2, 4, 6, 8, 11 and 12 represented hierarchical items. This was to control for any existing political viewpoints participants may hold that influence the effectiveness of stealing thunder, and trust restoration. A manipulation check asked participants to select whether they believed the transgression in question was related to either the integrity or competence of the politician.

Procedure

Participants were provided with, and followed, a link to an online data collection site (www.limesurvey.com). Participants initially read through instructions and provided demographic details such as sex, age and whether they were studying at the University of Tasmania, before commencing with the research material. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four between-subjects conditions and read the brief biography and completed the first batch of measures, specifically, those in Appendices I and L. Participants then read their allocated version of the transgression disclosure (a press release or newspaper article detailing a transgression), before completing another round of measures. These measures were the same as those obtained pre-transgression. Further measures of support for the politician's party, and participant screening measures were then obtained (See Appendix J). Participants answered a dichotomous question indicating whether they believe the politician used any type of manipulation strategy, and if so, a follow-up question explaining what they believed that strategy to be (See Appendix M). Participants then completed the other measures adapted from Kim et al.'s (2004) items and Kahan et al.'s (2012) worldviews scale as an index of sociopolitical affiliation. Participants completed the manipulation check, stating whether they believed the transgression to be a matter of the politician's integrity or competence. Finally, participants were asked whether they had been honest and thorough in completing the study, to discourage and potentially identify dishonest answers.

Results

Data were analyzed in SPSS using ANOVAs for continuous measures, and chi-square cross-tabulation to analyze categorical measures.

Data and Participant Screening

We screened data for outliers and incomplete data. Three participants' data were removed as they indicated that they were not thorough and honest in their answers. Statistical outliers were identified with one measure (perceptions of the damage done by Stevens' action to his party). These outliers were removed. When data violated the assumptions of specific analyses, appropriate corrections were applied.

There were no significant main effects or interactions between conditions when looking at the extent to which participants cared about politics ($F < 0.91$, $p > .343$). However, when analysing whether there were differences between groups for how knowledgeable participants were about politics, a significant main effect of thunder was found. Those in the stealing thunder condition ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.23$, 95%CI [3.90, 4.72]) were significantly more knowledgeable than those in the thunder condition ($M = 3.65$, $SD = 1.62$, [3.25, 4.06]), $F(1,95) = 5.03$, $p = .027$, $np^2 = .050$.

Results from the manipulation check indicated that 54% of participants in the competence condition believed the transgression to be a matter of Stevens' integrity, whilst 98% of those in the integrity condition believed it to be a matter of integrity. We return to this issue later.

The last group of items measured were items taken from Kahan et al.'s (2012) world view scale. Scores for items relating to individualism and hierarchy were averaged and then analysed respectively. There were no differences across groups for either individualism or hierarchy ($F < 1.51$, $p > .222$). Therefore, scores on these measures cannot account for the patterns in results. Thus, these measures were not factored into analyses.

Trustworthiness

A 2(Time) x 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) mixed ANOVA, with Time as the within-subjects variable, examined effects on trustworthiness (see Table 1). Committing the transgression damaged participants' perceptions of trust in Stevens, where ratings of trustworthiness were significantly lower after he committed the transgression (M = 2.45, SD = 1.30, [2.21, 2.69]) compared to before (M = 4.46, SD = 1.05, [4.25, 4.67]), indicated by a significant main effect of Time. Participants also gave overall higher ratings of trustworthiness when Stevens' transgression was related to his competence (M = 3.72, SE = 0.14, [3.45, 4.00]) compared to his integrity (M = 3.18, SE = 0.14, [2.91, 3.45]), as indicated by a significant main effect of Transgression. A significant Time x Transgression interaction with follow-up simple effects analysis found that after Stevens committed the transgression, participants gave higher ratings of trustworthiness when the transgression was related to Stevens competence (M = 2.94, SD = 1.32, [2.60, 3.28]) as opposed to his integrity (M = 1.96, SD = 1.08, [1.61, 2.30]), $F(1, 95) = 16.26$, $p < .001$, $\eta p^2 = .146$. Additionally, a borderline significant Time x Transgression x Thunder interaction was identified, which we have interpreted with caution given (a) the absence of conventional significance and (b) the small effect size. It appears that when Stevens released the negative information about himself, participants gave him higher ratings of trust post-transgression when it was related to his competence (M = 2.88, SD = 1.42, [2.38, 3.37]) as opposed to his integrity (M = 2.12, SD = 1.13, [1.64, 2.60]), $F(1, 95) = 4.76$, $p = .032$, $\eta p^2 = .048$. Furthermore, when the media released the negative information, ratings of trust were higher post-transgression when it related to Stevens' competence (M = 3.00, SD = 1.23, [2.53, 3.47]), rather than his integrity (M = 1.79, SD = 1.02, [1.30, 2.28]), $F(1, 95) = 4.76$, $p = .001$, $\eta p^2 = .116$. These results are illustrated in Figure 1.

Table 1

Mixed ANOVA on Trustworthiness Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	7.89	.077	.006
Tr error	95			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.75	.008	.389
Th x Tr	1	0.003	0.00	.954
Th error	95			
Within Subjects				
Time (T)	1	270.95	.74	<.001
T x Tr	1	12.97	.120	.001
T error	95			
T x Th	1	0.28	.003	.595
T x Th x Tr	1	3.78	.038	.055
T x Th x Tr error	95			



Figure 1. Time x thunder x transgression interaction of ratings of trustworthiness. This figure illustrates the differences in trustworthiness scores across conditions both pre- and post-transgression.

Likelihood of Voting

A 2(Time) x 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) mixed ANOVA, with Time as the within-subjects variable, examined effects on participants' likelihood of voting for Stevens (see Table 2). Committing the transgression negatively affected the likelihood of people voting for Stevens, with the chance of voting lower after he committed the transgression (M = 2.74, SD = 1.50, [2.45, 3.02]) than before (M = 4.42, SD = 1.40, [4.14, 4.70]), as indicated by a significant main effect of Time. Furthermore, consistent with the effects on trustworthiness, the significant Time x Transgression interaction indicated that the effect of time was lower for competence (M = 3.18, SD = 1.57, [2.78, 3.59]) than integrity (M = 2.29, SD = 1.27, [1.88, 2.70]) based transgressions, $F(1,95) = 9.54$, $p = .003$, $np^2 = .091$. There was no Time x Transgression x Thunder Type interaction, thereby not supporting our hypotheses.

Table 2

Mixed ANOVA on Likelihood of Voting Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	3.51	.036	.064
Tr error	95			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.17	.002	.166
Th x Tr	1	1.01	.011	.318
Th error	95			
Within Subjects				
Time (T)	1	119.44	.557	<.001
T x Tr	1	8.39	.081	.005
T error	95			
T x Th	1	1.68	.017	.198
T x Th x Tr	1	0.71	.007	.403
T x Th x Tr error	95			

Binary Vote

Given the mixed factorial design of our research, there was no appropriate inferential analysis for our categorical data. Therefore, we have adopted Cummings' (2013) approach and will rely on a visual inspection of means and confidence intervals. We plotted mean proportions and associated 95% CIs for each cell in the design (see Figure 2). If these 95% CIs overlap, we could conclude there is not meaningful difference between conditions. Figure 2 shows the predictable effect of committing a transgression on voter intentions: Participants were less likely to vote

for Stevens after he committed the transgression than before. There were no significant effects of thunder or transgression type pre- or post-transgression.



Figure 2. Cross-tabulation of participant voting decisions. This figure illustrates the proportion of participants who would vote for Stevens across conditions.

Approval of Politician

21 participants stated that they 'didn't know' when answering this question pre-transgression, and 15 'didn't know' post-transgression. Therefore, their data for this question were not analyzed. These responses were spread evenly across conditions, therefore there is no reason to suspect the exclusion of these data contributed to the pattern of results obtained.

This item was reverse scored, meaning that this increase in raw score indicates a decrease in approval. A 2(Time) x 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) mixed ANOVA, with Time as the within-subjects variable, examined effects on approval of Stevens (see Table 3). Committing the transgression damaged Stevens' approval ratings, where participants approved of him more before he committed the

transgression (*M* = 2.04, *SD* = 0.32, [1.96, 2.12]) compared to after (*M* = 2.93, *SD* = 0.77, [2.71, 3.12]), as indicated by a significant main effect of Time. Additionally, consistent with the effects on trustworthiness and likelihood of voting, committing the transgression hurt Stevens approval ratings more so when the transgression was related to his integrity (*M* = 3.15, *SD* = 0.74, [2.89, 3.41]) as opposed to his competence *M* = 2.72, *SD* = 0.75, [2.46, 2.97]), $F(1, 65) = 5.70$, $p = .020$, $np^2 = .08$. This was indicated by a significant Time x Transgression Type interaction.

Table 3

Mixed ANOVA on Approval of Politician Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	3.60	.052	.062
Tr error	65			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.02	0.00	.890
Th x Tr	1	0.11	.002	.739
Th error	65			
Within Subjects				
Time (T)	1	95.49	.595	<.001
T x Tr	1	6.55	.092	.013
T error	65			
T x Th	1	0.02	0.00	.886
T x Th x Tr	1	0.44	.007	.510
T x Th x Tr error	65			

Job Approval

17 participants stated that they 'didn't know' when answering this question pre-transgression, and 28 stated they 'didn't know' when answering post-transgression, and therefore their data for this question was not analyzed. The number of participants who stated that they did not know was almost equal across groups, however increased post-transgression. More participants were unsure about their approval of the job Stevens was doing after he committed the wrongdoing.

Items were reverse scored for this measure, where higher ratings indicate low approval. A 2(Time) x 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) mixed ANOVA, with Time as the within-subjects variable, examined effects on participants' perception of approval of the job Stevens was doing as a politician (see Table 4). Committing the transgression hurt Stevens' approval ratings, with ratings being higher pre-transgression (M = 1.98, SD = 0.33, [1.90, 2.06]) than post-transgression (M = 2.54, SD = 0.73, [2.36, 2.71]), as indicated by a significant main effect of Time. Additionally, approval ratings were higher after Stevens released the negative information himself (M = 2.36, SD = 0.60, [2.11, 2.61]), as opposed to when the media released the negative information (M = 2.71, SD = 0.81, [2.46, 2.96]), $F(1,62) = 3.99$, $p = .050$, $np^2 = .060$, as indicated by a significant Time x Thunder interaction.

Table 4

Mixed ANOVA on Job Approval Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	2.99	.046	.089
Tr error	62			

Thunder (Th)	1	2.46	.038	.122
Th x Tr	1	0.29	.005	.595
Th error	62			
Within Subjects				
Time (T)	1	37.90	.379	<.001
T x Tr	1	0.98	.015	.327
T error	62			
T x Th	1	4.47	.067	.039
T x Th x Tr	1	1.23	.019	.271
T x Th x Tr error	62			

Policy Support

A 2(Time) x 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) mixed ANOVA, with Time as the within-subjects variable, examined effects on policy support (see Table 5). Policy support was significantly lower after Stevens committed the transgression (M = 3.83, SD = 1.68, [3.49, 4.17]) compared to before (M = 4.84, $S D$= 1.53, [4.53, 5.15]). This was indicated by a significant main effect of Time. There were no other significant effects.

Table 5

Mixed ANOVA on Policy Support Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	0.14	.001	.712

Tr error	95			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.02	0.00	.895
Th x Tr	1	0.24	.002	.629
Th error	95			
Within Subjects				
Time (T)	1	45.34	.323	<.001
T x Tr	1	2.14	.022	.147
T error	95			
T x Th	1	1.40	.015	.239
T x Th x Tr	1	0.55	.006	.459
T x Th x Tr error	95			

Binary Policy Support

As with analysing the binary vote measures, this data was analysed using cross-tabulations as shown in Figure 3. Policy support decreased post-transgression compared to pre-transgression in all conditions. Furthermore, participants were less willing to support Stevens' policy post-transgression in the thunder competence condition.



Figure 3. Cross-tabulation of policy support decisions. Graph showing the proportion of participants who would support Stevens across conditions.

Negative Effect on Party

A 2(Transgression) x 2 (Thunder) univariate ANOVA examined effects on whether participants believed Stevens' actions would negatively affect his party (see Table 6). There was a significant main effect of Transgression and a significant Thunder x Transgression interaction. Participants thought Steven's actions would negatively affect his party more so in the integrity condition (M = 6.17, SD = 1.00, [5.87, 6.48]) than the competence condition, (M = 5.65, SD = 1.18, [5.35, 5.94]). Furthermore, when the media released the information about Stevens' transgression, participants thought the transgression would negatively affect Stevens' party more so when it related to his integrity (M = 6.39, SD = 0.89, [5.96, 6.82]) than his competence (M = 5.15, SD = 1.19, [4.75, 5.56]), $F(1,90) = 17.45$, $p < .001$, np^2 = .162. Additionally, participants thought Stevens' actions would negatively affect his party more when he stole thunder (M = 6.14, SD = 0.94, [5.70, 6.58]), compared to

the media releasing the information (M = 5.15, SD = 1.19, [4.75, 5.56]), when the transgression was related to his competence, $F(1,90) = 10.74$, $p = .001$, $np^2 = .107$.

Table 6

Univariate ANOVA on Negative Effect on Party Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	6.11	.064	.015
Tr error	90			
Thunder (Th)	1	1.64	.018	.204
Th x Tr	1	10.97	.109	.001
Th error	90			
Th x Tr error	90			

Manipulation

When looking at whether participants believed Stevens was using a manipulation strategy, 36 (36.4%) participants explicitly stated they believed Stevens used a manipulation strategy, compared to 63 (63.6%) who did not. Furthermore, more participants said he was using a manipulation strategy in the stealing thunder competence condition (40%) than any other condition. This could assist in explaining the trends found in other measures obtained, and perhaps be somewhat accountable for the lack of effectiveness of certain manipulations. Comments made by participants suggested they believed Stevens should have known better than to commit a transgression in this scenario, and was trying to cover it up (See Appendix O).

Adapted Kim et al. (2004) Items

Items taken from Kim et al.'s (2004) study were divided into sections and averaged to give ratings of competence, integrity, willingness to risk and job responsibilities. The last item asking whether participants think Stevens would commit a similar offense in the future was analysed separately. Significant main effects of Transgression were found with ratings of integrity and job responsibilities, as indicated by several 2(Transgression) x 2(Thunder) univariate ANOVAs (see Tables 7 & 8). When the transgression was related to Stevens' integrity (M = 5.62, SD = 1.13, [5.29, 5.96]), participants thought he had significantly lower integrity than when the transgression related to his competence (M = 4.42, SD = 1.22, [4.09, 4.75]). Similarly, when the transgression was integrity-related (M = 4.83, SD = 1.37, [4.47, 5.19]), participants stated they would give Stevens less job responsibilities than when the transgression was related to his competence (M = 4.27, SD = 1.13, [3.91, 4.63]). This item was reverse scored, where higher scores represent less job responsibility.

Table 7

Univariate ANOVA on Integrity Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	25.47	.211	<.001
Tr error	95			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.52	.005	.472
Th x Tr	1	0.34	.004	.561

Th error	95			
Th x Tr error	95			

Table 8

Univariate ANOVA on Job Responsibility Ratings

Effect	df	F	np^2	p
Between Subjects				
Transgression (Tr)	1	4.83	.048	.030
Tr error	95			
Thunder (Th)	1	0.27	.003	.603
Th x Tr	1	0.03	0.00	.860
Th error	95			
Th x Tr error	95			

Trust Regression Analysis

Given the pattern of results obtained for effects of transgression type on measures of trust, likelihood of voting and approval, we ran a regression analysis to determine if changes in trust (from pre- to post-transgression) mediated the observed effects of transgression type on the key support measures (e.g., likelihood of voting and approval). Multiple regression analysis was conducted using Hayes' Process Model looking at the effects of trust on likely voting behaviour and approval of Stevens. Change variables (for trust, likely voting, and approval) were calculated by subtracting post-transgression scores from pre-transgression scores.

When analysing the change in the likelihood of voting for Stevens, in the initial model, transgression type significantly predicted the likelihood of voting of

Stevens, $F(1,100) = 11.48$, $p = .001$, $R^2 = .103$, with participants more likely to vote for Stevens following a competence (cf. integrity) transgression, $b = 0.82$ [0.34, 1.31], $p = .001$. However, adding the change in trust variable significantly improved the fit of the model, $F(2,99) = 3.02$, $p = .053$, $R^2 = .058$, , $b = 0.41$ [0.07, 0.74], $p = .018$, and the direct effect of transgression type (i.e., the part of the effect unrelated to change in trust) was no longer significant, $b = -0.12$ [-0.98, 0.74], $p = .784$. Similar results were found when analysing the chance in approval ratings for Stevens, where transgression type significantly predicted approval ratings in the initial model, $F(1,66) = 10.01$, $p = .002$, $R^2 = .132$, with higher ratings following a competence-based transgression, $b = 0.86$ [0.32, 1.41], $p = .002$. However, the fit of the model was significantly improved by adding the change in trust variable, $F(2,65) = 2.79$, $p = .069$, $R^2 = .079$, $b = -0.17$ [-0.33, -0.16], $p = .018$. Consequently, the direct effect of transgression type was longer significant, $b = -0.00$ [-0.38, 0.37], $p = 1.00$.

Discussion

Based on the demonstrated efficacy of stealing thunder in reducing the damaging effects of negative information in legal settings (Dolnik et al., 2003; Williams et al., 1993, we expected that stealing thunder (cf. a thunder only condition) would reduce the impact of negative information on support for a politician following a transgression in a political setting. Consistent with previous work on trust restoration (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006 & Kim et al., 2009), we also hypothesized that (a) integrity transgressions would be more damaging than competence transgression, and (b) stealing thunder would be more effective for competence-based transgressions than integrity-based transgressions. Results somewhat confirmed our first hypothesis, demonstrating that stealing thunder did reduce the impact of negative information on support for a

politician in one measure obtained. However, it was not more effective for competence-based transgression, contradicting previous research (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006 & Kim et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we did find results to support prior research regarding the effectiveness of trust restoration following different types of transgressions.

In this study, measures of support for Stevens, support for his policy and support for his party were obtained. For all measures, ratings of support decreased following the presentation of information relating to the transgression. Therefore, the manipulations in this study were effective at reducing perceived support. Additionally, manipulating transgression type also influenced ratings of integrity and job responsibility (based on our adapted Kim et al. (2004) measures). Furthermore, trust mediated the relationship between transgression type on measures of support for Stevens, demonstrating that trust was the mechanism causing changes in participants' approval of, and likelihood of voting for, Stevens. This is an intuitive finding that demonstrates the potential detrimental effects of committing a wrongdoing and breaking trust in a political setting.

Support for Stevens

When looking at specific measures of support for Stevens, a trend was identified with participants' ratings of trustworthiness of Stevens, approval of Stevens and likelihood of voting for Stevens. For all of these measures, significant interactions indicated that participants in the competence conditions gave significantly higher ratings post-transgression than those in the integrity conditions. When the transgression was related to Stevens' competence, participants were more likely to trust him after he committed the wrongdoing than when the transgression was related to his integrity. Thus, the negative effects of committing a transgression

were weaker when the transgression reflected a failure of competence rather than integrity. Furthermore, adapted measures from Kim et al. (2004) such as integrity and job responsibilities also follow this trend. Participants' perceptions of Stevens' integrity and job responsibility were rated more negatively when the transgression was integrity-related as opposed to competence-related. Therefore, when Stevens committed the transgression purposefully, participants thought he had less integrity and were less willing to assign him a job with high responsibility. These findings are consistent with prior research on trust restoration that suggests that people are more forgiving of someone who has committed a transgression related to their competence than their integrity (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006 & Kim et al., 2009). When someone commits a wrongdoing related to their competence, it can be perceived as an honest mistake and others are more likely to give them another chance. Alternatively, when a wrongdoing is committed and is related to the persons' integrity, the individual is perceived as having questionable morals and beliefs (Kim et al., Madon et al., 1997; Martijn et al., 1992). In this case, people are less forgiving as there is perceived to be greater potential for the person to purposefully commit further wrongdoings. Thus, competence-based transgressions (cf. integrity-based transgressions) tend to be perceived as inherently less serious, and therefore have a less detrimental effect on perceptions of trust (Kim et al.; Snyder & Stukas Jr, 1999). Overall, following information about the transgression, participants trusted, approved of, and were more likely to vote for Stevens when the transgression he committed was related to his competence rather than his integrity.

To further reinforce the idea that change in trust was the underlying mechanism driving changing participants' perceptions of Stevens, regression analyses were conducted. We found that the effects of transgression type for

measures of approval of Stevens and likelihood of voting for Stevens were fully predicted by changes in trust. Therefore, transgression type affected trust, which then affected measures of approval and likelihood of voting for Stevens. The trend found in results such as likelihood of voting for Stevens and approval of Stevens, where ratings of support are higher when the transgression is related to Stevens' competence, is caused by a change in trust.

A binary measure of whether participants would vote for Stevens indicated a large decrease in the percentage of participants who would vote for Stevens post-transgression compared to pre-transgression. However, there were no differences in whether participants would vote for Stevens depending on transgression type, or the thunder manipulation. This could be a reflection of the lack of sensitivity of binary ratings in this context. For example, in this scenario Stevens was an independent politician, however it is possible that people's pre-existing allegiances with a party influenced their decision about whether or not to vote for Stevens. If an individual has an allegiance to a certain party, they may be reluctant to commit to voting for a politician that does not belong to the party they support: People's voting allegiances can be very stable and difficult to change (Carlin & Love, 2013). Therefore, in this study, continuous measures/ratings may be more sensitive in identifying the effects of our manipulations on participants' beliefs, as they are not asking for a conclusive statement.

However, differing effects were found when looking at measures of job approval, being how much participants approved of the job Stevens was doing as a politician. When Stevens stole thunder ratings of job approval were higher than when he did not steal thunder, suggesting that stealing thunder reduces the negative effect of a transgression on job approval. Therefore, participants approved of the job

Stevens was doing more when information about the transgression was released by Stevens in the press conference (self-disclosure). This is consistent with previous literature on the effects of stealing thunder, where stealing thunder is said to decrease the negative impact of damaging information (Dolnik et al., 2003, Williams et al., 1993). In this scenario, stealing thunder may have decreased the negative impact of the damaging information by leading people to perceive Stevens as more honest and trustworthy and hence approve of the job he was doing. However, if this is the case for this measure, then it could be argued that this should be true for other measures obtained. It is noted that approximately 17.2% of participants gave an 'I don't know' answer for this measure pre-transgression, and 28.3% of participants gave the same response post-transgression. The removal of these data and hence, inclusion of remaining data may have contributed to the finding of this effect. For example, if these excluded participants specifically stated that they would not vote for Stevens in the binary measure, and/or gave a more neutral rating of how likely they were to vote for Stevens, this may have potentially skewed the data. Furthermore, this measure may have been interpreted somewhat differently to the other measures of support for the politician. For example, measures of trustworthiness, approval of the politician and likelihood of voting for the politician all directly relate to the politician, whereas approval of the job the politician was doing relates to the politician's job. It is possible that the type of transgression committed is more indicative of support and trust in a politician, whereas type of disclosure may be more indicative of support and trust in relation to how well they perform at their job. It could beneficial to explore this idea in future research.

A measure of participants' socio-political affiliations was obtained in this study to control for potential mediating factors, as research suggests that pre-existing

socio-political ideologies could influence support for politicians, and punitive stance following a transgression (Carlin & Love, 2013). In this study, finding differences between groups in socio-political affiliations may have contributed to the pattern of results, as opposed to the study manipulations being accountable. However, participants' beliefs did not differ between groups and therefore did not have an influence on the results. Additional participant screening measures were conducted to control for any differences in participant knowledge or care for politics between groups. Participants in the stealing thunder condition reported being more knowledgeable, compared to those in the thunder condition. This could suggest that those in the stealing thunder condition have a greater awareness of politicians and perhaps strategies they use to gain support. This could therefore account for the lack of effect of stealing thunder across most conditions.

When asked whether they believed Stevens utilized a manipulation strategy, over a third of participants explicitly stated he did. This could suggest that these participants did not believe Stevens was being truthful or honest. A manipulation check was also conducted in this study. Participants were asked to state whether they believed Stevens' transgression to be a matter of his competence or integrity. Of those in the stealing thunder integrity, and thunder integrity conditions, almost all of the participants stated it was a matter of Stevens' integrity. However, in both the stealing thunder competence and thunder competence conditions, approximately half of participants stated it was a matter of integrity, and the other half stated it was a matter of competence. This could suggest that even when the transgression was related to Stevens' competence, participants did not believe him and instead stated it was a matter of his integrity. This is possibly an example of peoples' general mistrust

of politicians, as any transgression was more likely to be perceived as a matter of the politicians' integrity.

Support for Stevens' Party

A similar trend to that identified regarding support for Stevens was identified with participants' perceptions of how Stevens' transgression would negatively affect his party. When the transgression was related to Stevens competence, again, there was less of a negative effect. Furthermore, there were more detrimental effects when the media released information about the transgression relating to Stevens' integrity, echoing other findings. However, when Stevens stole thunder and the transgression was a matter of his competence there was a more negative effect. This could suggest that when Stevens' released the information about himself and claimed it was a mistake, people did not believe him, and therefore gave him lower ratings. This is potentially reinforced by results from looking at whether participants perceived manipulation, and the manipulation check. Therefore, these findings suggest that after a politician has committed a transgression, support for their party does not mimic support for the politician.

Support for Stevens' Policy

Support, and hence trust, in Stevens decreased after he committed the transgression, however despite the effects observed for the other measures, there were no significant differences between conditions for ratings of support for Stevens' policy. This suggests that regardless of how the negative information (transgression) was disclosed and the type of transgression, participants' perceptions of Stevens's policy were similar. This disconfirms the hypothesis that there would be differences depending on disclosure type and transgression type, and contradicts previous research in stealing thunder and trust restoration. Therefore, it could be concluded

that when a politician commits a transgression, it also damages support for their policy.

Limitations and Future Research

There are a number of potential limitations to consider when interpreting our results. First, the results of the manipulation check could be perceived as a limitation, as those in the competence conditions were predisposed to interpret Stevens' transgression as a matter of integrity. Nevertheless, this may be a reflection of participants' perceptions of Stevens *as a politician*. Thus, this may reflect a genuine psychological construct, as opposed to simply being a limitation/failed manipulation. For example, just over a third of participants explicitly stated they believed Stevens utilised a manipulation strategy, suggesting they did not believe Stevens was acting honestly. Comments made by some participants suggest they recognised the strategy being used to be that of manipulating perceptions. Stevens did this by either releasing the negative information in an attempt to seem more trustworthy, or "manipulating the public by spinning his image into one of an 'honest fool'… he is lying about not knowing he was evading taxes". Others stated that Stevens is a politician and therefore educated and "should have known better".

Dolnik et al. (2003) found that if people become aware or suspect that a manipulation strategy such as stealing thunder is being utilised, it is no longer effective. It is possible, that in this scenario participants perhaps did not believe Stevens when he stated the transgression was a matter of his competence (importantly, in our materials, Stevens' claims were endorsed by third parties, as per Kim et al., 2004), as he is a politician and should have known better than to commit such a serious offense. Therefore, even when the transgression was a matter of Stevens' competence, some participants viewed it as a matter of his integrity.

Furthermore, a higher percentage of participants believed Stevens utilised a manipulation strategy in the stealing thunder condition than in the thunder condition, potentially suggesting when Stevens released the information himself, and it was a matter of his competence, people were less likely to believe him because they generalised the perceived manipulation associated with the attempt to steal thunder as indicating a lack of integrity. This contradicts some of the previous findings in this study that suggests that when the transgression is related to Stevens competence, there is less of a negative effect of the transgression. However, not all of the participants believed Stevens utilised a manipulation strategy, and approximately half believed Stevens when he stated the transgression was a matter of his competence. Therefore, there is still reason to suggest there would be differing effects for integrity versus competence based transgressions. Nevertheless, stealing thunder was still ineffective.

Second, it may be that stealing thunder was not effective in a political setting due to current socio-political contextual factors distorting people's perceptions of politicians. This study was conducted in an Australian election year (in fact, data were collected around the time that voters were going to the polls), meaning people may have been more aware and critical of politicians and their actions. The American presidential election may have also added to the salience of politics during the time in which the study was conducted, with presidential debates and press conferences being broadcasted in the media. If people were more aware and critical, they may not wholly believe a politician, and during an election suspect that the politician may use any means necessary to ensure they get elected, including utilise a manipulation strategy. This could be a potential explanation as to why no effects of

stealing thunder were found. Due to these potential influencing factors, it would be beneficial to conduct this study again in a non-election year.

The context of the materials used in this study may have also been a limitation. The use of the Panama Papers and tax evasion as context for the transgression the politician committed may have influenced the results. For example, this is quite a serious transgression with serious consequences such as gaol time. However, participants may have reacted differently if the transgression Stevens committed was less serious, as it is possible that participants may have been less critical of Stevens, and hence given less negative ratings. It is unknown whether the severity of transgression would influence the effectiveness of stealing thunder. Additionally, the type of transgression may have influenced results, such as whether it was related to Stevens' job, the law, or personal matters. In this study, the transgression was evading taxes and breaking the law. However, participants' perceptions of Stevens may have been different if the transgression he committed was a wrongdoing in his personal life, such as being unfaithful in a relationship. Nevertheless, the use of the Panama Papers as context could also be perceived as a strength, as it provides good ecological validity for the manipulation.

Another limitation that may have effected results is that of demand characteristics. When asking participants if they believed Stevens utilised manipulation strategy, demand characteristics may have lead the participants to state that they did believe Stevens used a manipulation strategy, despite previous beliefs. However, participants had already given pre- and post-transgression ratings of support before being asked about a manipulation, therefore the effects observed should not have been influenced.

There are plans to replicate this study in the future, during a period of time when elections are not being held and politics and the Panama Papers are less salient to control for the contextual factors mentioned.

Implications

There are several important implications of this study. Firstly, it may be that stealing thunder is not as effective in a political setting, and it may be unrealistic to assume it would be as effective. For example, people may be inherently less trusting of politicians, due to the nature of the job they are doing and people's perceived intentions of politicians. It is fair to say that politicians are constantly being scrutinized in the media, and these attitudes may transfer to the general public. Nevertheless, we found an effect of stealing thunder in some measures. However, if a politician commits a wrongdoing on purpose (it is a reflection of their integrity), then utilizing stealing thunder will not be beneficial for them. Their actions are going to negative effect themselves, their party and policy regardless of whether they utilize a manipulation strategy. Therefore, when contemplating whether their future actions could be perceived as a wrongdoing, a politician should thoroughly consider the chance of the media finding out, as there may be nothing the politician can do to redeem themselves once the information is released.

This study has provided evidence to suggest that the negative consequences of politician's actions also affect their party and policy. Therefore, if a politician commits a transgression, they people may no longer vote for the politician, vote for the party associated with the politician, nor will they support the politician's policy. Furthermore, if politician has made a mistake, or committed a wrongdoing by accident, it is recommended that they steal thunder by releasing the information in a press conference. Evidence from this study suggests that whilst there will still be

some negative consequences for the politician, party and their policy, these consequences will be less negative than if the media released the information. There is a chance at forgiveness if the politician has made an honest mistake. However, if people suspect or are aware that a manipulation strategy was utilized, it would not have any effect. Therefore, general knowledge of stealing thunder in the wider population is not advantages for politicians who have made a mistake and want the public's support. Additionally, manipulation strategies used by politicians may influence how the public vote, as identifying these strategies may remove or lessen the effect, and therefore lead to less-biased voting (Williams et a., 1993).

Conclusion

In the current study, overall, we found consistent effects of the type of transgression a politician commits influencing peoples' support for that politician. Ratings of support were higher when a transgression committed by a politician was related to their competence (cf. their integrity). Therefore, people will be more forgiving of a politician if the transgression they commit is related to their competence. Alternatively, if the transgression a politician commits is related to their integrity, they may encounter more severe consequences of their actions. Furthermore, we found that trust as a mechanism is the driving force behind the results we found, therefore changes in support for the politician was caused by changes in trust. Lastly, we found that stealing thunder did not have an effect on most of our measures. There is some evidence to suggest it may be effective, however these effects were not as consistent as those reported in the literature. Therefore, this study would benefit from future research to minimise the influence of contextual factors.

References

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1970). The prediction of behavior from attitudinal and normative variables. *Journal of experimental social Psychology*, *6*(4), 466-487. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(70)90057-0

Archer, R. L., & Burleson, J. A. (1980). The effects of timing of self-disclosure on attraction and reciprocity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*(1), 120. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.38.1.120

Arpan, L. M., & Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R. (2005). Stealing thunder: Analysis of the effects of proactive disclosure of crisis information. *Public Relations Review*, *31*(3), 425-433. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.05.003

Arpan, L. M., & Pompper, D. (2003). Stormy weather: Testing "stealing thunder" as a crisis communication strategy to improve communication flow between organizations and journalists. *Public Relations Review*, *29*(3), 291-308. doi: 10.1016/S0363-8111(03)00043-2

Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk is not cheap: Substantive penance and expressions of intent in rebuilding cooperation. *Organization Science*, *13*(5), 497-513. doi: 10.1287/orsc.13.5.497.7816

Butler, J. K., & Cantrell, R. S. (1984). A behavioral decision theory approach to modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. *Psychological reports*. doi: 10.2466/pr0.1984.55.1.19

Carlin, R. E., & Love, G. J. (2013). The politics of interpersonal trust and reciprocity: an experimental approach. *Political Behavior*, *35*(1), 43-63. doi: 10.1007/s11109-011-9181-x

Claeys, A. S., Cauberghe, V., & Leysen, J. (2013). Implications of stealing thunder for the impact of expressing emotions in organizational crisis communication. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, *41*(3), 293-308. doi: 10.1080/00909882.2013.806991

Collins, N. L., & Miller, L. C. (1994). Self-disclosure and liking: a meta-analytic review. *Psychological bulletin*, *116*(3), 457. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.116.3.457

Cummings, G. (2013). The new statistics: Why and how. *Psychological Science,* 0956797613504966.doi: 10.1177/0956797613504966

Dolnik, L., Case, T. I., & Williams, K. D. (2003). Stealing thunder as a courtroom tactic revisited: Processes and boundaries. *Law and Human Behavior*, *27*(3), 267. doi: 10.1023/A:1023431823661

Eagly, A. H., Wood, W., & Chaiken, S. (1978). Causal inferences about communicators and their effect on opinion change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*(4), 424. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.36.4.424

Fennis, B. M., & Stroebe, W. (2014). Softening the blow: Company self-disclosure of negative information lessens damaging effects on consumer judgment and decision making. *Journal of business ethics*, *120*(1), 109-120. doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1647-9

Ferrin, D. L., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007). Silence speaks volumes: the effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial for responding to integrity-and competence-based trust violations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(4), 893. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.893

Haesevoets, T., Folmer, C. R., & Van Hiel, A. (2015). Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence-versus

Integrity-Based Trust Violations. *PloS one*, *10*(12), e0145952. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0145952

Howard, M. V., Brewer, N., & Williams, K. D. (2006). How processing resources shape the influence of stealing thunder on mock-juror verdicts. *Psychiatry, Psychology and Law*, *13*(1), 60-66. doi: 10.1375/pplt.13.1.60

Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M. Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2012). The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. *Nature Climate Change*, *2*(10), 732-735. doi: 10.1038/nclimate1547

Kassin, S. M., Reddy, M. E., & Tulloch, W. F. (1990). Juror interpretations of ambiguous evidence. *Law and Human Behavior*, *14*(1), 43-55. doi: 10.1007/BF01055788

Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). The repair of trust: A dynamic bilateral perspective and multilevel conceptualization. *Academy of Management Review*, *34*(3), 401-422. doi: 10.5465/AMR.2009.40631887

Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence-vs. integrity-based trust violation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *99*(1), 49-65. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.07.002

Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2004). Removing the shadow of suspicion: the effects of apology versus denial for repairing competence-versus integrity-based trust violations. *Journal of applied psychology*, *89*(1), 104. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.104

Madon, S., Jussim, L., & Eccles, J. (1997). In search of the powerful self-fulfilling prophecy. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *72*(4), 791. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.791

Martijn, C., Spears, R., Van der Pligt, J., & Jakobs, E. (1992). Negativity and positivity effects in person perception and inference: Ability versus morality.*European Journal of Social Psychology*, *22*(5), 453-463. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420220504

Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of management review*, *20*(3), 709-734. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080335

Ohbuchi, K. I., Kameda, M., & Agarie, N. (1989). Apology as aggression control: its role in mediating appraisal of and response to harm. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *56*(2), 219. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.219

Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal perception. *Psychological Review*, *86*(1), 61. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.86.1.61

Schwartz, G. S., Kane, T. R., Joseph, J. M., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1978). The effects of post-transgression remorse on perceived aggression, attributions of intent, and level of punishment. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *17*(4), 293-297. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1978.tb00283.x

Snyder, M., & Stukas Jr, A. A. (1999). Interpersonal processes: The interplay of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral activities in social interaction. *Annual review of psychology*, *50*(1), 273-303. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.273

Williams, K. D., Bourgeois, M. J., & Croyle, R. T. (1993). The effects of stealing thunder in criminal and civil trials. *Law and Human Behavior*, *17*(6), 597. doi: 10.1007/BF01044684

Appendix A

Mayer, Davis and Shoorman's Model of Trust (1995)



Appendix B

Kim, Ferrin, Cooper and Dirks' Trust Repair Model (2004)



Appendix C

Biography:

Scott James Stevens was born in Launceston, Tasmania, in 1973. Stevens was born into an educated family, and since a young age had a keen interest in leadership and politics. His father was a previous Tasmanian Senator, and a successful and well-respected politician. As he grew older, Stevens' had intentions of following in his father's footsteps.

After earning a Political Science degree from the University of Tasmania in 1994, Stevens travelled to mainland Australia to study law at the University of Melbourne. However, it wasn't until Stevens returned to Tasmania after completing his second degree that he decided to pursue a political career.

After several years of representing and working for other candidates, Stevens ran for a position in the Tasmanian Legislative Council as an independent candidate. Stevens was elected into the Tasmanian Legislative Council in 2005 representing the electorate of Windermere. Stevens applied for and was appointed to the Standing Committee for Public Accounts and the Select Committee for Pensioner's Health Care in 2009. In 2012, Stevens resigned his position with the Tasmania Legislative Council to seek election to Federal parliament as the member for Bass. He was elected on first preference votes in 2013 as an independent/crossbench senator representing the Australian Finance Party.

Appendix D

AFP

Policy Brief

Prepared by Scott Stevens on 20th April 2016

Adjusting superannuation- fixing the issue with finances

Executive Summary

Anxiety and stress surrounding the taxation of superannuation is increasing. As, currently, superannuation taxes are benefiting the wealthy and not the poor.

Introduction

One issue that has been causing much anxiety and stress amongst the general population is that of the taxation of superannuation. Over the years the original purpose of superannuation has been lost. Superannuation was intended to assist the average working person to support themselves following retirement; ensuring that citizens were not entirely dependent on government-provided benefits or the support of family members. However, it has been argued that superannuation is becoming less about assisting pensioners after retirement, and more about assisting those capable of supporting themselves without government aid. Taxation laws on superannuation are currently said to favour the wealthy and those who are capable of looking after themselves, as opposed to the people who actually require the assistance. For example, those who can better afford to support themselves are making voluntary superannuation contributions by way of salary sacrifice, which decreases the amount of tax they are actually paying. Whereas those who earn less may not have the funds to sacrifice to superannuation, in which case they are not benefiting as much as those with more money because they do not have the

opportunity to decrease their taxable income while simultaneously increasing their post-retirement nest-egg.

Policy Options

The proposed reform is that of lowering the cap on concessional contributions. Concessional contributions are contributions that are made to your superannuation funds before income tax is taken out. By lowering the cap it would decrease the amount of money people could contribute, increasing the amount of tax paid on concessional contributions. This would increase tax paid by high-income earners who currently benefit from tax-free concessional contributions and potentially allowing those earning less to benefit from tax relief. This could also facilitate superannuation accumulation for citizens in these lower income brackets. Admittedly, this policy could be framed as targeting the wealthier in the population. Critics could argue it is not restoring fairness and equity in the taxation of superannuation.

Policy Recommendations

Lowering the concessional contributions cap (from $30,000 to $20,000 each financial year) should increase the government's earnings by approximately $2-5 billion a year, and stop those who earn in the top percentages from exploiting the superannuation system to reduce their taxable income. This increased revenue will allow for tax benefits for those with lower incomes.

Appendix E

25th April 2016

ISLAND STATE NEWS

www.islandstatenews.com TASMANIA'S FAVOURITE NEWSPAPER –Since 1980

STEVENS CAUGHT OUT AS MORE PANAMA NAMES RELEASED

There has been a considerable amount of media attention surrounding the recent Panama Papers controversy, as many wealthy individuals and public officials from around the world are being identified for potential financial transgressions. Some of those involved are national and state leaders and representatives: People whom the general population should be able to trust. Recently, representative of the Australian Finance Party, Scott Stevens, has been found to be associated with Mossack Fonseca and the Panama Papers.

The Panama Papers are a collection of several million leaked documents detailing potential financial indiscretions, such as tax evasion and fraud. The documents were first leaked in early 2015, and describe client-attorney information associated with Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian law firm. Those who have already been identified include heads of state and government leaders in Argentina, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine as well as associates from over forty other countries.

Stevens' name is now associated with the Mossack Fonseca firm. Investigations into Stevens' transgression show that he has been evading paying Australian taxes for several years. He allegedly did this through creating an offshore bank account through the Mossack Fonseca firm.

Stevens' opened the offshore bank account in in October of 2013 following discussions with a colleague who had recommended the firm. Reports from unnamed sources close to Stevens say his intentions in doing this were to avoid paying taxes. An investigation by the Australian Taxation Office has confirmed that Stevens had evaded taxes. The accounts have since been closed, and there will most likely be repercussions for his actions.

The stability of Stevens' position in Federal politics is questionable. When contacted and asked to comment, Stevens admitted he has done the wrong thing and that he was aware of that when he made the decision to open the account. Both critics and supporters of Senator Stevens have recognized this as an issue of integrity, not competence.

"Overall, I take full responsibility for my actions and associations with Mossack Fonseca, as it was entirely my decision as I took the opportunity when it arose. My intentions were to evade taxes. I regret the decisions I have made and can assure you that this will not happen again in the future. I apologize to the people of Australia. I sincerely hope I will be forgiven and this will not effect my position in Federal politics".

Appendix F

Press conference held at 9:04am AEST, on 25th April 2016.

Stevens: "Clearly, there has been a considerable amount of media attention surrounding the recent Panama Papers controversy, as many wealthy individuals and public officials from around the world are being identified for potential financial transgressions. Some of those involved are national and state leaders and representatives: People whom the general population should be able to trust. With much regret, I am here to announce that I, Scott Stevens, representative of the Australian Finance Party, have also had associations with Mossack Fonseca and the Panama Papers.

For those of you who may not know, the Panama Papers are a collection of several million leaked documents detailing potential financial indiscretions, such as tax evasion and fraud. The documents were first leaked in early 2015, and describe client-attorney information associated with Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian law firm. Those who have already been identified include heads of state and government leaders in Argentina, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine as well as associates from over forty other countries.

I am here today to apologize to Tasmania, and Australia, as my name is now associated with the Mossack Fonseca firm and the Panama Papers. For several years now I have been evading paying Australian taxes. I did this through creating an offshore bank account through the Mossack Fonseca firm.

I opened the offshore bank account in October of 2013 following discussions with a colleague who had recommended the firm. To be clear, my intentions in doing this were to avoid paying Australian taxes. The Australian Taxation Office confirmed that I had failed to pay required taxes.

The accounts have since been closed, and I am aware there will most likely be repercussions for my actions. I understand this will affect the stability of my position in Federal politics. Both my supporters and my critics have been open in declaring this as an issue of integrity, rather than competence. I realize I have done the wrong thing. I was aware of this when I made the decision to open the account. I take full responsibility for my actions and associations with Mossack Fonseca, as it was entirely my decision as I took the opportunity when it arose. My intentions were to evade taxes. I regret the decisions I have made and can assure you that this will not happen again in the future.

Again, I apologize to the people of Australia. I sincerely hope I will be forgiven and this will not effect my position in Federal politics.

I will not be taking any questions today. Thank you for your time".

Appendix G

25th April 2016

ISLAND STATE NEWS

www.islandstatenews.com TASMANIA'S FAVOURITE NEWSPAPER –Since 1980

STEVENS' CAUGHT OUT AS MORE PANAMA NAMES RELEASED

There has been a considerable amount of media attention surrounding the recent Panama Papers controversy, as many wealthy individuals and public officials from around the world are being identified for potential financial transgressions. Some of those involved are national and state leaders and representatives: People whom the general population should be able to trust. Recently, representative of the Australian Finance Party, Scott Stevens, has been found to be associated with Mossack Fonseca and the Panama Papers.

The Panama Papers are a collection of several million leaked documents detailing potential financial indiscretions, such as tax evasion and fraud. The documents were first leaked in early 2015, and describe client-attorney information associated with Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian law firm. Those who have already been identified include heads of state and government leaders in Argentina, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine as well as associates from over forty other countries.

Stevens' name is now associated with the Mossack Fonseca firm. Investigations into Stevens' activities show that he was enquiring about opening an offshore bank account through the Mossack Fonseca firm. He opened an account, however claims he was unaware of any legal activity associated with tax avoidance.

It may be fair to say Stevens showed ignorance; he had doubts about the integrity of the Mossack Fonseca law firm, but his knowledge was limited. He opened the offshore bank account in late 2014, following a discussion with a colleague who had recommended the firm. Perhaps Stevens was misled. Prior to the release of the Panama Papers, Stevens halted any dealings he had with the firm, concerned that he may have inadvertently committed tax evasion.

An investigation by the Australian Taxation Office has confirmed that Stevens has evaded paying Australian taxes. Steven's recently stated: "I had evaded paying Australian taxes. This I am guilty of, however I was completely unaware that this is what I was doing. I assumed in opening an offshore account I would be doing so legally, for the purpose of furthering my investments. I was wrong in my assumptions."

The stability of Stevens' position in Federal politics is questionable. When contacted and asked to comment, Steven's admitted he had doubts about the firm, but claimed he was genuinely unaware of the criminal behaviour linked with Mossack Fonseca. He admitted he had unintentionally done the wrong thing. Both critics and supporters of Senator Stevens have recognized this as an issue of competence, rather than integrity.

"Overall, I made an error in judgment in associating with Mossack Fonseca. I had no intention of evading taxes. I regret the decisions I have made and can assure you that this will not happen again in the future. I apologize to the people of Australia for my incompetence; I sincerely hope I will be forgiven and this will not effect my position in Federal politics".

Appendix H

Press conference held at 9:04am AEST, on 25th April 2016.

*Stevens: "*Clearly, there has been a considerable amount of media attention surrounding the recent Panama Papers controversy, as many wealthy individuals and public officials from around the world are being identified for potential financial transgressions. Some of those involved are national and state leaders and representatives: People whom the general population should be able to trust. With much regret, I am here to announce that I, Scott Stevens, representative of the Australian Finance Party, have also had associations with Mossack Fonseca and the Panama Papers.

For those of you who may not know, the Panama Papers are a collection of several million leaked documents detailing potential financial indiscretions, such as tax evasion and fraud. The documents were first leaked in early 2015, and describe client-attorney information associated with Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian law firm. Those who have already been identified include heads of state and government leaders in Argentina, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine as well as associates from over forty other countries.

I am here today to apologize to Tasmania, and Australia, as my name is now associated with the Mossack Fonseca firm. Several years ago I opened an offshore bank account through the Mossack Fonseca firm. I opened an account, however not for the purpose of evading taxes.

I was ignorant of this aspect of the firm's functioning circumstance. I had some doubts about the integrity of the Mossack Fonseca law firm, but my knowledge was limited. I originally enquired about opening the offshore bank account in late 2014, following a discussion with a colleague who recommended the firm.

Unfortunately I was initially misled as to the firm's legitimacy. Prior to the release of the Panama papers I put a halt to any dealings I had with the firm, concerned that I may have inadvertently committed tax evasion.

Since then, investigations by the Australian Taxation Office have determined that I had evaded paying Australian taxes. This I am guilty of, however I was completely unaware that this is what I was doing. I assumed in opening an offshore account I would be doing so legally, for the purpose of furthering my investments. I was wrong in my assumptions.

I understand the stability of my position in Federal politics is questionable. I was unaware of the criminal behaviour linked with Mossack Fonseca. Both my supporters and critics have been open in declaring this an issue of competence, rather than integrity. Overall, I made an error in judgment in associating with Mossack Fonseca. I had no intention of evading taxes. I regret the decisions I have made and can assure you that this will not happen again in the future. I apologize to the people of Australia for my incompetence; I sincerely hope I will be forgiven and this will not effect my position in Federal politics".

Appendix I

Trust Likert Scales

Based on the information provided, how much would you trust Scott Stevens? Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.

To what extent do you support Scott Stevens' proposed policy? (Where 1= not at all, and 7= very strongly support).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

How trustworthy is Scott Stevens? (Where 1= not at all, and 7= extremely trustworthy).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Do you approve of Scott Stevens?

Strongly approve Approve Disapprove Strongly Disapprove Don't know

Do you approve of the job Scott Stevens is doing as a senator?

Strongly approve Approve Disapprove Strongly Disapprove Don't know

What is the chance you would vote for Scott Stevens? (Where 1= extremely unlikely, and 7= extremely likely).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix J

How likely do you think it is that Scott Stevens' actions would negatively affect his party? (Where 1= not at all likely, and 7= very likely).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

To what extent do you care about current political matters?

Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.

(Where 1= Not at all, and 7= Very much).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

To what extent do you consider yourself knowledgeable about political events?

Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.

(Where 1= Not at all, and 7= Very much).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix K

For each statement below, please circle the number that corresponds to your answer.

Where 1= strongly agree, and 7= strongly disagree.

#	Item	SA			N			SD
1	Stevens is very capable of performing his job	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2	Stevens has much knowledge about the work that needs to be done	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3	I feel very confident about Stevens' skills	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4	I like Stevens' values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	Sound principles seem to guide Stevens' behaviour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6	Stevens has a great deal of integrity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7	I wouldn't let Stevens have any influence over issues that are important to me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	I would keep an eye on Stevens	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	I would give Stevens a task or problem that was critical to me, even if I could not monitor his actions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10	I would be willing to assign Stevens the most complex portfolios	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11	I would assign Stevens the same amount of responsibility as I would to his colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12	I would give Stevens the same amount of autonomy in his role as his colleagues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13	I believe that Stevens will commit a similar offence in the future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix L

Based on the information provided, circle the answer that best represents your thinking.

Would you vote for this politician? YES / NO

Would you support the policy documented earlier? YES / NO

Appendix M

Would you say that in this situation the politician used any sort of manipulation strategy? YES/NO

If you answered yes to the previous question, please briefly explain what strategy you think was used.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Appendix N

This next series of questions is asking about your sociopolitical affiliations. This section is not compulsory and you may choose to skip it and continue with the rest of the survey if you so desire.

For each statement below, please tick the box that corresponds to your answer.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements, where 1= Strongly disagree and 6= Strongly Agree.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.						
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.						
It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.						
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, indigenous and non-indigenous people, and men and women.						
The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.						
Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.						
Sometimes government needs to make laws						

that keep people from hurting themselves.						
Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.						
The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.						
Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.						
It seems like indigenous people, women, homosexuals and other groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.						
Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.						

Appendix O

Comments made by participants on what manipulation strategy they believed Stevens to have used (by condition).

Thunder Competence

"Claiming to be helping the lower income earners but probably just a cover for his indiscretions"

"apology and claimed innocence"

"The policy is written to appeal to a target sector of the voting population at the expense of a perceived wealthy minority. The apology seeks to circumvent further scrutiny and generate empathy from voters."

"Manipulating the public by spinning his image into one of an "honest fool". Chances are, he is lying about not knowing he was avoiding taxes."

"Pleading Ignorance. A politician with such knowledge should be well aware of scams and illegal activity. Saying he had no idea either proves he is not academically fit for government or proves that he is a liar. "

Stealing Thunder Integrity

"Trying to introduce ways to create more taxes but not wanting to pay the correct tax in his personal life"

"Rather than allowing the media to dictate and control the release of information about his financial situation he took control and admitted what he had done. By being overly apologetic and stating that he was aware of what he had done and the reasons for doing it he was trying to appear like he was honest and still had some integrity."

"He made himself look good too the public do he would get votes. A liar."

“By admitting his mistake and taking "full responsibility" for his actions, Scott is attempting to get in early as other federal politicians will no doubt be named. By getting in early and admitting his guilt, Scott is hoping that denial and subsequent backpedalling of other politicians will draw attention away from him.”

“Furthermore, admitting his mistake may well win Scott brownie points as it is seen as honest and reflective.”

“The politician try to get the vote of low income earners and the poor into believing the policing might be beneficial to them”

“Taking the focus of his financial agenda to focus on the people's”

Thunder Integrity

“A good one.”

“By openly apologising only in response to being caught. Many voters could see this as an honest mistake and attempt to amend his wrong doing, and still vote for him. Whereas if he was not caught for tax evasion he would not have apologised as he would not have come forward about doing it.”

“I think he has seen the current situation and tried to make money where he can, while he can and done so in an illegal fashion.”

“Well he has knowingly participating in tax evasion. That's manipulating the tax system”

“gaining votes from the less fortunate and manipulating the disadvantaged”

“By admitting fault and then stating he hope it does not effect his position some may empathise and consider that he is remorseful and therefore redeemed himself.”

“Baited the majority (average income group) by sugar coating the plan, telling them the good things, but less details of the consequences and long term effects”

“Manipulation of low income earners to vote for him”

“Portraying himself as a supporter of lower socioeconomic families whilst undermining the tax system through his own actions”

“He manipulated people into believing he was doing the right thing by closing the gap of inequality in order to get them on his side. “

Stealing Thunder Competence

“In his explanation of the offshore account I feel that he was trying to diminish the severity of his actions by saying he was aware but not aware of the illegality of the offshore account. He was trying to remove liability from himself by saying he made a mistake”

“He appologiesed but as an educated Ma I don't believe his plead of ignorance, he was smart enough to know what he was doing “

“It appears that the politician, once his offshore account was exposed, attempted to manipulate public perception (around his trustworthiness and ethics) through disingenuous apologies and excuses. Offshore accounts are commonly associated with tax fraud and money laundering. He would/should have known about this. Once exposed, he is attempting to minimize political damage.”

“Pleaded ignorance as an acceptable defence”

“Framed apology to maximise best possible outcome for himself. As a financial minister, be should (hopefully) have been far more knowledgeable about the legality of offshore banking than he admitted.”

“Potentially an educated man to be in politics - probably should have been aware that an offshore account was subject to a tax exemption.”

“claiming ineptitude was attempting to make him appear 'just like anyone else' however with his education, training and portfolio it was fairly suspicious that he was truely unaware”

“his strategy was to not admit he actively tried to evade taxes and that it was a misunderstanding on his part but that he should have tried to understand more. I feel he is being deceptive in using this language to avoid admitting that someone with 2 degrees didn't know what he was really doing”

“Stevens' failed to declare his interests in tax evasion or minimisation strategies.”

“Turning off himself and making it look as if it was all a complete accident and that he was genuine. “

“Simply by denying knowledge of his wrongdoing, he creates doubt. Many Australians are of a mind that anyone deserves the benefit of the doubt.”

“Yes of course. His apology statement would have most likely be written by someone other than himself as it the text would have been carefully selected to provoke a particular message to the Australian people. So some type of strategy would have been decided upon by the politician and his group so that they handled the possibly detrimental situation the best way they would in the public eye. “

“if he was unsure about the offshore account, further investigation into the bank and the friend who recommended it could have been done”

UNIVERSITY of TASMANIA

Participant Information Sheet 1, 11.07.2016

Appendix P

Factors that affect Perceptions of Trust

Information for research participants

1. Invitation

You are invited to participate in an online study examining trust and decision making in a political setting.
The study is being conducted by Drs. James Sauer and Matthew Palmer (both Senior Lecturers, Division of Psychology, School of Medicine, UTAS) and Miss Katelyn Jones (Honours Student, Division of Psychology, School of Medicine, UTAS). This study is being conducted in partial fulfilment of an Honours degree for Miss Jones under the supervision of Dr Sauer.

2. What is the purpose of this study?

People's judgments about how trustworthy politicians are depend on many different factors. This study will investigate factors that affect how much people are willing to trust politicians, and how they can affect support for proposed policies.

3. Why have I been invited to participate?

Anyone over 18 years of age is eligible to participate. Your participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous, and there are no consequences if you choose not to participate.

4. What will I be asked to do?

You will be asked to complete the study via an online survey. You will be asked to read some information about a hypothetical politician and a scenario in which they were involved, and then answer some questions about the scenario. There will be a further questionnaire asking you about your socio-political affiliations. You are not required to answer the questionnaire if you do not wish. You may exclude this part of the survey without consequence.
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. We are interested in your opinion and judgment, and it is important for the accuracy of the research that your responses are as honest as possible. Participation is for one session only and is expected to take approximately 20 minutes in total.

5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study?

We do not expect that there will be direct benefits to participants in this study. The study will help us form a better understanding of the factors that

UNIVERSITY of TASMANIA

Participant Information Sheet 1, 11.07.2016

influence people's willingness to trust others. This knowledge may lead to some useful recommendations for those who would like to garner public support in political contexts.

6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study?

There are no specific risks anticipated from participating in this study. However, if you experience any distress as a result of participation please feel free to contact the research supervisor, Dr Sauer. Alternatively, should you wish to access counselling or support services, you can contact the University of Tasmania counselling service on (03) 6226 2697 or (03) 6324 3787.

7. What if I change my mind during or after the study?

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be asked to provide any explanation for doing so. If you choose to complete the questionnaires, we will not be able to remove your data at a later time because your responses will not contain any identifying information.

8. What will happen to the information when this study is over?

All information from the study will be kept securely on the University of Tasmania's server in de-identified form (so that no responses can be identified as belonging to a particular person) to ensure that your anonymity is maintained. The data will only be accessible to the researchers listed above in accordance with NHMRC guidelines. Access will be restricted via password protection.
At your discretion, you may choose to allow your data to be archived for use in future research. Unless you indicate your consent to your data being archived below, it will be kept for five years from the date of publication and then deleted from the server.

9. How will the results of the study be published?

Once completed, a summary of results will be available on the University of Tasmania's Psychology web page via the following address:
http://www.utas.edu.au/psychology/research
We anticipate that results will be available by the end of November, 2015.

10. What if I have questions about this study?

If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study you are very welcome to contact Dr James Sauer via email at jim.sauer@utas.edu.au or on 6226 2051, or Katelyn Jones at khjones@utas.edu.au.

UNIVERSITY of TASMANIA

Participant Information Sheet 1, 11.07.2016

This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics reference number H0014913.

Thank you for taking the time to consider this study.

If you would like to participate, please read the information about informed consent provided on the next screen.

UNIVERSITY of TASMANIA

Participant Consent Form 1, 11.07.2016

Appendix Q

Factors that affect Perceptions of Trust

This consent for is for participants interested in completing this study.

1. I agree to take part in the research study named above.
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study.
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me.
4. I understand that the study involves reading a scenario and answering a questionnaire, about an alleged transgression committed by a hypothetical politician. Then I will complete an additional questionnaire. There will be questions asking me about my socio-political affiliations, however I am not required to answer these questions if I choose not to. This should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. I understand that participation involves no anticipated risks to me as a participant.
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of Tasmania premises for five years from the publication of the study results, and will then be destroyed
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
7. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of the research.
8. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be identified as a participant as data will be kept de-identified and my information will not be linked to my data.

   Yes ☐ No ☐
9. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without any effect.
10. I understand that I will not be able to withdraw my data after completing the online study as data will be kept in de-identified form so my information cannot be linked to my data.

UNIVERSITY of TASMANIA

Participant Consent Form 1, 11.07.2016

If you are of 18 years of age and older, and wish to participate given that you fully understand and confirm the statements above, then click on the “I agree” button to begin participation.

I Agree ☐ I do not agree ☐

Appendix R
Ethics Amendment Approval Email

Dear Dr Palmer

Ethics Ref: H0014913
Title: Factors that affect Perceptions of Trust

This email is to confirm that the following amendment was approved by the Chair of the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee on 15/7/2016:

- Addition of Dr James Sauer and Honours student Katelyn Jones.
- Amendment to extend the context of the project to include an investigation of factors that affect perceptions of trust in the political context.
- Revised Information Sheet, Consent Form and Materials.

All committees operating under the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network are registered and required to comply with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC 2007, updated May 2015).

This email constitutes official approval. If your circumstances require a formal letter of amendment approval, please let us know.

Should you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me.

Kind regards
Katherine

Katherine Shaw
Executive Officer, Social Sciences HREC
Office of Research Services | Research Division
University of Tasmania
Private Bag 1
Hobart TAS 7001
T +61 3 6226 2763
[www.utas.edu.au/research]www.utas.edu.au/research

Appendix S

SPSS Data Output

Policy Support

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
time	Sphericity Assumed	50.155	1	50.155	45.343	.000	.323
	Greenhouse-Geisser	50.155	1.000	50.155	45.343	.000	.323
	Huynh-Feldt	50.155	1.000	50.155	45.343	.000	.323
	Lower-bound	50.155	1.000	50.155	45.343	.000	.323
time * transgression	Sphericity Assumed	2.365	1	2.365	2.138	.147	.022
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2.365	1.000	2.365	2.138	.147	.022
	Huynh-Feldt	2.365	1.000	2.365	2.138	.147	.022
	Lower-bound	2.365	1.000	2.365	2.138	.147	.022
time * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	1.552	1	1.552	1.403	.239	.015
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1.552	1.000	1.552	1.403	.239	.015
	Huynh-Feldt	1.552	1.000	1.552	1.403	.239	.015
	Lower-bound	1.552	1.000	1.552	1.403	.239	.015
time * transgression * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	.613	1	.613	.554	.459	.006
	Greenhouse-Geisser	.613	1.000	.613	.554	.459	.006
	Huynh-Feldt	.613	1.000	.613	.554	.459	.006
	Lower-bound	.613	1.000	.613	.554	.459	.006
Error(time)	Sphericity Assumed	105.082	95	1.106			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	105.082	95.000	1.106			
	Huynh-Feldt	105.082	95.000	1.106			
	Lower-bound	105.082	95.000	1.106			

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Transformed Variable: Average

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	3718.152	1	3718.152	891.133	.000	.904
transgression	.572	1	.572	.137	.712	.001
thunder	.073	1	.073	.017	.895	.000
transgression * thunder	.981	1	.981	.235	.629	.002
Error	396.377	95	4.172			

Approval of Stevens

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
time	Sphericity Assumed	27.265	1	27.265	95.396	.000	.595
	Greenhouse-Geisser	27.265	1.000	27.265	95.396	.000	.595
	Huynh-Feldt	27.265	1.000	27.265	95.396	.000	.595
	Lower-bound	27.265	1.000	27.265	95.396	.000	.595
time * transgression	Sphericity Assumed	1.873	1	1.873	6.554	.013	.092
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1.873	1.000	1.873	6.554	.013	.092
	Huynh-Feldt	1.873	1.000	1.873	6.554	.013	.092
	Lower-bound	1.873	1.000	1.873	6.554	.013	.092
time * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	.006	1	.006	.021	.886	.000
	Greenhouse-Geisser	.006	1.000	.006	.021	.886	.000
	Huynh-Feldt	.006	1.000	.006	.021	.886	.000
	Lower-bound	.006	1.000	.006	.021	.886	.000
time * transgression * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	.125	1	.125	.439	.510	.007
	Greenhouse-Geisser	.125	1.000	.125	.439	.510	.007
	Huynh-Feldt	.125	1.000	.125	.439	.510	.007
	Lower-bound	.125	1.000	.125	.439	.510	.007
Error(time)	Sphericity Assumed	18.577	65	.286			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	18.577	65.000	.286			
	Huynh-Feldt	18.577	65.000	.286			
	Lower-bound	18.577	65.000	.286			

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Transformed Variable: Average

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	847.654	1	847.654	2160.348	.000	.971
transgression	1.411	1	1.411	3.597	.062	.052
thunder	.007	1	.007	.019	.890	.000
transgression * thunder	.044	1	.044	.112	.739	.002
Error	25.504	65	.392			

Estimates

Measure: MEASURE_1

transgression	time	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	1	2.057	.055	1.948	2.167
	2	2.716	.128	2.460	2.971
integrity	1	2.026	.056	1.914	2.138
	2	3.153	.131	2.892	3.414

Pairwise Comparisons

Measure: MEASURE_1

time	(I) transgression	(J) transgression	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	competence	integrity	.031	.078	.695	-.126	.187
	integrity	competence	-.031	.078	.695	-.187	.126
2	competence	integrity	-.437*	.183	.020	-.802	-.072
	integrity	competence	.437*	.183	.020	.072	.802

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Measure: MEASURE_1

time		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
1	Contrast	.016	1	.016	.155	.695	.002
	Error	6.833	65	.105			
2	Contrast	3.268	1	3.268	5.703	.020	.081
	Error	37.248	65	.573			

Each F tests the simple effects of transgression within each level combination of the other effects shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

Likelihood of Voting

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
time	Sphericity Assumed	140.082	1	140.082	119.443	.000	.557
	Greenhouse-Geisser	140.082	1.000	140.082	119.443	.000	.557
	Huynh-Feldt	140.082	1.000	140.082	119.443	.000	.557
	Lower-bound	140.082	1.000	140.082	119.443	.000	.557
time * transgression	Sphericity Assumed	9.835	1	9.835	8.386	.005	.081
	Greenhouse-Geisser	9.835	1.000	9.835	8.386	.005	.081
	Huynh-Feldt	9.835	1.000	9.835	8.386	.005	.081
	Lower-bound	9.835	1.000	9.835	8.386	.005	.081
time * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	1.975	1	1.975	1.684	.198	.017
	Greenhouse-Geisser	1.975	1.000	1.975	1.684	.198	.017
	Huynh-Feldt	1.975	1.000	1.975	1.684	.198	.017
	Lower-bound	1.975	1.000	1.975	1.684	.198	.017
time * transgression * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	.827	1	.827	.705	.403	.007
	Greenhouse-Geisser	.827	1.000	.827	.705	.403	.007
	Huynh-Feldt	.827	1.000	.827	.705	.403	.007
	Lower-bound	.827	1.000	.827	.705	.403	.007
Error(time)	Sphericity Assumed	111.415	95	1.173			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	111.415	95.000	1.173			
	Huynh-Feldt	111.415	95.000	1.173			
	Lower-bound	111.415	95.000	1.173			

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Transformed Variable: Average

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	2530.103	1	2530.103	877.738	.000	.902
transgression	10.123	1	10.123	3.512	.064	.036
thunder	.478	1	.478	.166	.685	.002
transgression * thunder	2.908	1	2.908	1.009	.318	.011
Error	273.840	95	2.883			

Estimates

Measure: MEASURE_1

transgression	time	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	1	4.421	.198	4.028	4.815
	2	3.184	.205	2.778	3.591
integrity	1	4.415	.200	4.018	4.812
	2	2.286	.207	1.875	2.696

Pairwise Comparisons

Measure: MEASURE_1

time	(I) transgression	(J) transgression	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	competence	integrity	.006	.282	.982	-.553	.566
	integrity	competence	-.006	.282	.982	-.566	.553
2	competence	integrity	.898*	.291	.003	.321	1.476
	integrity	competence	-.898*	.291	.003	-1.476	-.321

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Measure: MEASURE_1

time		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
1	Contrast	.001	1	.001	.001	.982	.000
	Error	186.452	95	1.963			
2	Contrast	19.957	1	19.957	9.537	.003	.091
	Error	198.803	95	2.093			

Each F tests the simple effects of transgression within each level combination of the other effects shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

Care About Politics

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: care_politics

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2.429[a]	3	.810	.364	.779	.011
Intercept	2490.938	1	2490.938	1118.700	.000	.922
thunder	.422	1	.422	.189	.664	.002
transgression	2.023	1	2.023	.908	.343	.009
thunder * transgression	.035	1	.035	.016	.900	.000
Error	211.531	95	2.227			
Total	2709.000	99				
Corrected Total	213.960	98				

a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = -.020)

Knowledgeable About Politics

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: knowledgeable_politics

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	12.088[a]	3	4.029	1.915	.132	.057
Intercept	1567.325	1	1567.325	744.957	.000	.887
thunder	10.590	1	10.590	5.033	.027	.050
transgression	1.699	1	1.699	.808	.371	.008
thunder * transgression	.051	1	.051	.024	.876	.000
Error	199.872	95	2.104			
Total	1780.000	99				
Corrected Total	211.960	98				

a. R Squared = .057 (Adjusted R Squared = .027)

Measure of Competence

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: competence

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.005[a]	3	.002	.001	1.000	.000
Intercept	1150.516	1	1150.516	1110.743	.000	.921
thunder	.001	1	.001	.001	.980	.000
transgression	.001	1	.001	.001	.980	.000
thunder * transgression	.003	1	.003	.003	.955	.000
Error	98.402	95	1.036			
Total	1250.111	99				
Corrected Total	98.406	98				

a. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.032)

Measure of Integrity

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: integrity

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	36.779[a]	3	12.260	8.729	.000	.216
Intercept	2492.858	1	2492.858	1774.934	.000	.949
thunder	.732	1	.732	.521	.472	.005
transgression	35.772	1	35.772	25.470	.000	.211
thunder * transgression	.478	1	.478	.340	.561	.004
Error	133.426	95	1.404			
Total	2658.556	99				
Corrected Total	170.204	98				

a. R Squared = .216 (Adjusted R Squared = .191)

2. transgression

Dependent Variable: integrity

transgression	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	4.419	.168	4.086	4.752
integrity	5.622	.169	5.286	5.958

Willingness to Risk

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: willingness_risk

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	4.784[a]	3	1.595	1.362	.259	.041
Intercept	1009.262	1	1009.262	862.245	.000	.901
thunder	.273	1	.273	.233	.630	.002
transgression	3.855	1	3.855	3.293	.073	.034
thunder * transgression	.690	1	.690	.590	.444	.006
Error	111.198	95	1.171			
Total	1128.889	99				
Corrected Total	115.982	98				

a. R Squared = .041 (Adjusted R Squared = .011)

Job Responsibilities

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: job_responsibilities

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8.160[a]	3	2.720	1.686	.175	.051
Intercept	2047.553	1	2047.553	1269.338	.000	.930
thunder	.440	1	.440	.273	.603	.003
transgression	7.783	1	7.783	4.825	.030	.048
thunder * transgression	.050	1	.050	.031	.860	.000
Error	153.243	95	1.613			
Total	2209.889	99				
Corrected Total	161.403	98				

a. R Squared = .051 (Adjusted R Squared = .021)

2. transgression

Dependent Variable: job_responsibilities

transgression	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	4.270	.180	3.913	4.627
integrity	4.831	.181	4.471	5.191

Commit Similar Offense in Future

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: committ_future

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	7.762[a]	3	2.587	1.179	.322	.036
Intercept	1262.027	1	1262.027	574.855	.000	.858
thunder	1.632	1	1.632	.743	.391	.008
transgression	1.461	1	1.461	.665	.417	.007
thunder * transgression	4.756	1	4.756	2.166	.144	.022
Error	208.561	95	2.195			
Total	1475.000	99				
Corrected Total	216.323	98				

a. R Squared = .036 (Adjusted R Squared = .005)

Individualism Ratings

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: individualism

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.955[a]	3	.318	.716	.545	.024
Intercept	1147.025	1	1147.025	2578.005	.000	.967
thunder	.672	1	.672	1.510	.222	.017
transgression	.093	1	.093	.210	.648	.002
thunder * transgression	.152	1	.152	.341	.561	.004
Error	39.599	89	.445			
Total	1193.377	93				
Corrected Total	40.554	92				

a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.009)

Correlations

		age	individualism
age	Pearson Correlation	1	.197
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.059
	N	99	93
individualism	Pearson Correlation	.197	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.059	
	N	93	93

Hierarchical Ratings

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: hierarchy

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.527[a]	3	.176	.381	.767	.013
Intercept	1268.922	1	1268.922	2748.570	.000	.968
thunder	.017	1	.017	.037	.849	.000
transgression	.179	1	.179	.388	.535	.004
thunder * transgression	.337	1	.337	.731	.395	.008
Error	41.550	90	.462			
Total	1318.844	94				
Corrected Total	42.077	93				

a. R Squared = .013 (Adjusted R Squared = -.020)

Correlations

		age	hierarchy
age	Pearson Correlation	1	.312**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.002
	N	99	94
hierarchy	Pearson Correlation	.312**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	
	N	94	94

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Trustworthiness

Tests of Within-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
time	Sphericity Assumed	200.223	1	200.223	270.947	.000	.740
	Greenhouse-Geisser	200.223	1.000	200.223	270.947	.000	.740
	Huynh-Feldt	200.223	1.000	200.223	270.947	.000	.740
	Lower-bound	200.223	1.000	200.223	270.947	.000	.740
time * transgression	Sphericity Assumed	9.581	1	9.581	12.965	.001	.120
	Greenhouse-Geisser	9.581	1.000	9.581	12.965	.001	.120
	Huynh-Feldt	9.581	1.000	9.581	12.965	.001	.120
	Lower-bound	9.581	1.000	9.581	12.965	.001	.120
time * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	.210	1	.210	.284	.595	.003
	Greenhouse-Geisser	.210	1.000	.210	.284	.595	.003
	Huynh-Feldt	.210	1.000	.210	.284	.595	.003
	Lower-bound	.210	1.000	.210	.284	.595	.003
time * transgression * thunder	Sphericity Assumed	2.794	1	2.794	3.780	.055	.038
	Greenhouse-Geisser	2.794	1.000	2.794	3.780	.055	.038
	Huynh-Feldt	2.794	1.000	2.794	3.780	.055	.038
	Lower-bound	2.794	1.000	2.794	3.780	.055	.038
Error(time)	Sphericity Assumed	70.203	95	.739			
	Greenhouse-Geisser	70.203	95.000	.739			
	Huynh-Feldt	70.203	95.000	.739			
	Lower-bound	70.203	95.000	.739			

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Measure: MEASURE_1

Transformed Variable: Average

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Intercept	2357.943	1	2357.943	1283.919	.000	.931
transgression	14.497	1	14.497	7.894	.006	.077
thunder	1.377	1	1.377	.750	.389	.008
transgression * thunder	.006	1	.006	.003	.954	.000
Error	174.469	95	1.837			

Estimates

Measure: MEASURE_1

transgression	time	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	1	4.510	.149	4.214	4.806
	2	2.937	.171	2.597	3.278
integrity	1	4.408	.151	4.109	4.707
	2	1.956	.173	1.612	2.299

Pairwise Comparisons

Measure: MEASURE_1

time	(I) transgression	(J) transgression	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	competence	integrity	.101	.212	.634	-.319	.522
	integrity	competence	-.101	.212	.634	-.522	.319
2	competence	integrity	.982*	.243	.000	.498	1.465
	integrity	competence	-.982*	.243	.000	-1.465	-.498

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Measure: MEASURE_1

time		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
1	Contrast	.254	1	.254	.228	.634	.002
	Error	105.449	95	1.110			
2	Contrast	23.824	1	23.824	16.257	.000	.146
	Error	139.223	95	1.466			

Each F tests the simple effects of transgression within each level combination of the other effects shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

transgression	thunder	time	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	stealingthunder	1	4.750	.215	4.323	5.177
		2	2.875	.247	2.384	3.366
	thunder	1	4.269	.207	3.859	4.679
		2	3.000	.237	2.529	3.471
integrity	stealingthunder	1	4.400	.211	3.982	4.818
		2	2.120	.242	1.639	2.601
	thunder	1	4.417	.215	3.990	4.844
		2	1.792	.247	1.301	2.282

Pairwise Comparisons

Measure: MEASURE_1

thunder	time	(I) transgression	(J) transgression	Mean Difference (I–J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
stealingthunder	1	competence	integrity	.350	.301	.248	-.248	.948
		integrity	competence	-.350	.301	.248	-.948	.248
	2	competence	integrity	.755*	.346	.032	.068	1.442
		integrity	competence	-.755*	.346	.032	-1.442	-.068
thunder	1	competence	integrity	-.147	.298	.622	-.739	.445
		integrity	competence	.147	.298	.622	-.445	.739
	2	competence	integrity	1.208*	.343	.001	.528	1.889
		integrity	competence	-1.208*	.343	.001	-1.889	-.528

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Measure: MEASURE_1

thunder	time		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
stealingthunder	1	Contrast	1.500	1	1.500	1.351	.248	.014
		Error	105.449	95	1.110			
	2	Contrast	6.980	1	6.980	4.763	.032	.048
		Error	139.223	95	1.466			
thunder	1	Contrast	.271	1	.271	.244	.622	.003
		Error	105.449	95	1.110			
	2	Contrast	18.222	1	18.222	12.434	.001	.116
		Error	139.223	95	1.466			

Policy Support Pre-Transgression

thunder				pre_policy no	pre_policy yes	Total
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	8	16	24
			% within transgression	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	57.1%	45.7%	49.0%
			% of Total	16.3%	32.7%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	6	19	25
			% within transgression	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	42.9%	54.3%	51.0%
			% of Total	12.2%	38.8%	51.0%
	Total		Count	14	35	49
			% within transgression	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	7	19	26
			% within transgression	26.9%	73.1%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	63.6%	48.7%	52.0%
			% of Total	14.0%	38.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	4	20	24
			% within transgression	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	36.4%	51.3%	48.0%
			% of Total	8.0%	40.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	11	39	50
			% within transgression	22.0%	78.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_policy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	22.0%	78.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	15	35	50
			% within transgression	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.523[c]	1	.470		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.165	1	.684		
	Likelihood Ratio	.524	1	.469		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.538	.342
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.512	1	.474		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.765[d]	1	.382		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.284	1	.594		
	Likelihood Ratio	.774	1	.379		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.501	.298
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.750	1	.387		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.206[a]	1	.272		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.752	1	.386		
	Likelihood Ratio	1.213	1	.271		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.356	.193
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.194	1	.275		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.37.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.86.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.28.

Policy Support Post-Transgression

transgression * post_policy * thunder Crosstabulation

thunder				post_policy		Total
				no	yes	
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	10	14	24
			% within transgression	41.7%	58.3%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	58.8%	43.8%	49.0%
			% of Total	20.4%	28.6%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	7	18	25
			% within transgression	28.0%	72.0%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	41.2%	56.3%	51.0%
			% of Total	14.3%	36.7%	51.0%
	Total		Count	17	32	49
			% within transgression	34.7%	65.3%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	34.7%	65.3%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	12	14	26
			% within transgression	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	63.2%	45.2%	52.0%
			% of Total	24.0%	28.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	7	17	24
			% within transgression	29.2%	70.8%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	36.8%	54.8%	48.0%
			% of Total	14.0%	34.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	19	31	50
			% within transgression	38.0%	62.0%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	38.0%	62.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	22	28	50
			% within transgression	44.0%	56.0%	100.0%
			% within post_policy	61.1%	44.4%	50.5%
			% of Total	22.2%	28.3%	50.5%
		integrity	Count	14	35	49
			% within transgression	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	1.009[c]	1	.315		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.496	1	.481		
	Likelihood Ratio	1.013	1	.314		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.377	.241
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.989	1	.320		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	1.529[d]	1	.216		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.893	1	.345		
	Likelihood Ratio	1.542	1	.214		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.255	.173
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.498	1	.221		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.546[a]	1	.111		
	Continuity Correction[b]	1.923	1	.166		
	Likelihood Ratio	2.562	1	.109		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.144	.083
	Linear-by-Linear Association	2.520	1	.112		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.82.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.33.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.12.

Vote for Politician Pre-Transgression

transgression * pre_vote * thunder Crosstabulation

thunder				pre_vote		Total
				no	yes	
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	9	15	24
			% within transgression	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	52.9%	46.9%	49.0%
			% of Total	18.4%	30.6%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	8	17	25
			% within transgression	32.0%	68.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	47.1%	53.1%	51.0%
			% of Total	16.3%	34.7%	51.0%
	Total		Count	17	32	49
			% within transgression	34.7%	65.3%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	34.7%	65.3%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	6	20	26
			% within transgression	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	50.0%	52.6%	52.0%
			% of Total	12.0%	40.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	6	18	24
			% within transgression	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	50.0%	47.4%	48.0%
			% of Total	12.0%	36.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	12	38	50
			% within transgression	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	15	35	50
			% within transgression	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	51.7%	50.0%	50.5%
			% of Total	15.2%	35.4%	50.5%
		integrity	Count	14	35	49
			% within transgression	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	48.3%	50.0%	49.5%
			% of Total	14.1%	35.4%	49.5%
	Total		Count	29	70	99
			% within transgression	29.3%	70.7%	100.0%
			% within pre_vote	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	29.3%	70.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.163[c]	1	.686		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.011	1	.917		
	Likelihood Ratio	.164	1	.686		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.769	.458
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.160	1	.689		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.025[d]	1	.874		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
	Likelihood Ratio	.025	1	.874		
	Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.567
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.025	1	.875		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.024[a]	1	.876		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
	Likelihood Ratio	.024	1	.876		
	Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.526
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.024	1	.877		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.35.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.33.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.76.

Vote for Politician Post-Transgression

transgression * post_vote * thunder Crosstabulation

thunder				post_vote		Total
				no	yes	
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	20	4	24
			% within transgression	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	50.0%	44.4%	49.0%
			% of Total	40.8%	8.2%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	20	5	25
			% within transgression	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	50.0%	55.6%	51.0%
			% of Total	40.8%	10.2%	51.0%
	Total		Count	40	9	49
			% within transgression	81.6%	18.4%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	81.6%	18.4%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	20	6	26
			% within transgression	76.9%	23.1%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	54.1%	46.2%	52.0%
			% of Total	40.0%	12.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	17	7	24
			% within transgression	70.8%	29.2%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	45.9%	53.8%	48.0%
			% of Total	34.0%	14.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	37	13	50
			% within transgression	74.0%	26.0%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	74.0%	26.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	40	10	50
			% within transgression	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
			% within post_vote	51.9%	45.5%	50.5%
			% of Total	40.4%	10.1%	50.5%
		integrity	Count	37	12	49
			% within transgression	75.5%	24.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.091[c]	1	.763		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
	Likelihood Ratio	.091	1	.763		
	Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.527
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.089	1	.766		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	.241[d]	1	.624		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.028	1	.867		
	Likelihood Ratio	.240	1	.624		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.751	.433
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.236	1	.627		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.289[a]	1	.591		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.087	1	.768		
	Likelihood Ratio	.289	1	.591		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.635	.384
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.286	1	.593		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.89.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.41.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.24.

Manipulation Strategy

transgression * manip_strategy * thunder Crosstabulation

thunder				manip_strategy		Total
				no	yes	
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	11	13	24
			% within transgression	45.8%	54.2%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	36.7%	68.4%	49.0%
			% of Total	22.4%	26.5%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	19	6	25
			% within transgression	76.0%	24.0%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	63.3%	31.6%	51.0%
			% of Total	38.8%	12.2%	51.0%
	Total		Count	30	19	49
			% within transgression	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	19	7	26
			% within transgression	73.1%	26.9%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	57.6%	41.2%	52.0%
			% of Total	38.0%	14.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	14	10	24
			% within transgression	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	42.4%	58.8%	48.0%
			% of Total	28.0%	20.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	33	17	50
			% within transgression	66.0%	34.0%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	66.0%	34.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	30	20	50
			% within transgression	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
			% within manip_strategy	47.6%	55.6%	50.5%
			% of Total	30.3%	20.2%	50.5%
		integrity	Count	33	16	49
			% within transgression	67.3%	32.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	4.694[c]	1	.030		
	Continuity Correction[b]	3.509	1	.061		
	Likelihood Ratio	4.780	1	.029		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.042	.030
	Linear-by-Linear Association	4.598	1	.032		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	1.209[d]	1	.272		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.641	1	.423		
	Likelihood Ratio	1.213	1	.271		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.373	.212
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.185	1	.276		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.577[a]	1	.447		
	Continuity Correction[b]	.303	1	.582		
	Likelihood Ratio	.578	1	.447		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.532	.291
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.571	1	.450		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.82.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.31.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.16.

Actions Negatively Affect Party

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	21.302[a]	3	7.101	6.629	.000	.181
Intercept	3270.019	1	3270.019	3052.596	.000	.971
thunder	1.756	1	1.756	1.639	.204	.018
transgression	6.546	1	6.546	6.111	.015	.064
thunder * transgression	11.756	1	11.756	10.974	.001	.109
Error	96.410	90	1.071			
Total	3371.000	94				
Corrected Total	117.713	93				

a. R Squared = .181 (Adjusted R Squared = .154)

Estimates

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

thunder	transgression	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
stealingthunder	competence	6.136	.221	5.698	6.575
	integrity	5.957	.216	5.528	6.385
thunder	competence	5.154	.203	4.751	5.557
	integrity	6.391	.216	5.963	6.820

Pairwise Comparisons

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

transgression	(I) thunder	(J) thunder	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	stealingthunder	thunder	.983*	.300	.001	.387	1.578
	thunder	stealingthunder	-.983*	.300	.001	-1.578	-.387
integrity	stealingthunder	thunder	-.435	.305	.158	-1.041	.172
	thunder	stealingthunder	.435	.305	.158	-.172	1.041

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

transgression		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
competence	Contrast	11.504	1	11.504	10.739	.001	.107
	Error	96.410	90	1.071			
integrity	Contrast	2.174	1	2.174	2.029	.158	.022
	Error	96.410	90	1.071			

Each F tests the simple effects of thunder within each level combination of the other effects shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

Estimates

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

transgression	thunder	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
competence	stealingthunder	6.136	.221	5.698	6.575
	thunder	5.154	.203	4.751	5.557
integrity	stealingthunder	5.957	.216	5.528	6.385
	thunder	6.391	.216	5.963	6.820

Pairwise Comparisons

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

thunder	(I) transgression	(J) transgression	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.[b]	95% Confidence Interval for Difference[b]	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
stealingthunder	competence	integrity	.180	.309	.562	-.433	.793
	integrity	competence	-.180	.309	.562	-.793	.433
thunder	competence	integrity	-1.237*	.296	.000	-1.826	-.649
	integrity	competence	1.237*	.296	.000	.649	1.826

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

Univariate Tests

Dependent Variable: hurt_party

thunder		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
stealingthunder	Contrast	.364	1	.364	.339	.562	.004
	Error	96.410	90	1.071			
thunder	Contrast	18.688	1	18.688	17.446	.000	.162
	Error	96.410	90	1.071			

Each F tests the simple effects of transgression within each level combination of the other effects shown. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

Manipulation Check

transgression * manipulation_check * thunder Crosstabulation

thunder				manipulation_check		Total
				integrity	competence	
stealingthunder	transgression	competence	Count	14	10	24
			% within transgression	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	36.8%	90.9%	49.0%
			% of Total	28.6%	20.4%	49.0%
		integrity	Count	24	1	25
			% within transgression	96.0%	4.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	63.2%	9.1%	51.0%
			% of Total	49.0%	2.0%	51.0%
	Total		Count	38	11	49
			% within transgression	77.6%	22.4%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	77.6%	22.4%	100.0%
thunder	transgression	competence	Count	13	13	26
			% within transgression	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	35.1%	100.0%	52.0%
			% of Total	26.0%	26.0%	52.0%
		integrity	Count	24	0	24
			% within transgression	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	64.9%	0.0%	48.0%
			% of Total	48.0%	0.0%	48.0%
	Total		Count	37	13	50
			% within transgression	74.0%	26.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	74.0%	26.0%	100.0%
Total	transgression	competence	Count	27	23	50
			% within transgression	54.0%	46.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	36.0%	95.8%	50.5%
			% of Total	27.3%	23.2%	50.5%
		integrity	Count	48	1	49
			% within transgression	98.0%	2.0%	100.0%
			% within manipulation_check	64.0%	4.2%	49.5%
			% of Total	48.5%	1.0%	49.5%

Chi-Square Tests

thunder		Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
stealingthunder	Pearson Chi-Square	9.979[c]	1	.002		
	Continuity Correction[b]	7.933	1	.005		
	Likelihood Ratio	11.190	1	.001		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.002	.002
	Linear-by-Linear Association	9.775	1	.002		
	N of Valid Cases	49				
thunder	Pearson Chi-Square	16.216[d]	1	.000		
	Continuity Correction[b]	13.722	1	.000		
	Likelihood Ratio	21.262	1	.000		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	15.892	1	.000		
	N of Valid Cases	50				
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	26.039[a]	1	.000		
	Continuity Correction[b]	23.701	1	.000		
	Likelihood Ratio	30.906	1	.000		
	Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	25.776	1	.000		
	N of Valid Cases	99				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.88.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.39.

d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.24.

Vote for Politician Regression

```
**************************************************************************
Model = 4
    Y = vote_ch
    X = trans
    M = tr_ch

Sample size
        102

**************************************************************************
Outcome: tr_ch

Model Summary
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p
      .3209      .1030     1.5067    11.4784     1.0000   100.0000      .0010

Model
             coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
constant    1.5686      .1719     9.1263      .0000     1.2276     1.9096
trans        .8235      .2431     3.3880      .0010      .3413     1.3058

**************************************************************************
Outcome: vote_ch

Model Summary
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p
      .2398      .0575     4.3331     3.0198     2.0000    99.0000      .0533

Model
             coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
constant    -.3054      .3946     -.7740      .4408    -1.0884      .4776
tr_ch        .4072      .1696     2.4012      .0182      .0707      .7437
trans       -.1197      .4352     -.2749      .7839     -.9833      .7439

************************ DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS *************************

Direct effect of X on Y
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
     -.1197      .4352     -.2749      .7839     -.9833      .7439

Indirect effect of X on Y
          Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI
tr_ch      .3353      .1901      .0735      .8731
```

Approval of Politician Regression

```
**************************************************************************
Model = 4
    Y = appS_ch
    X = trans
    M = tr_ch

Sample size
         68

**************************************************************************
Outcome: tr_ch

Model Summary
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p
      .3628      .1317     1.2698    10.0069     1.0000    66.0000      .0024

Model
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
constant     1.7714      .1905     9.3001      .0000     1.3911     2.1517
trans         .8649      .2734     3.1634      .0024      .3190     1.4108

**************************************************************************
Outcome: appS_ch

Model Summary
          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p
      .2809      .0789      .5210     2.7851     2.0000    65.0000      .0691

Model
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
constant     -.1788      .1854     -.9640      .3386     -.5491      .1916
tr_ch        -.1733      .0788    -2.1978      .0315     -.3307     -.0158
trans        -.0008      .1879     -.0041      .9967     -.3761      .3746

********************* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS *************************

Direct effect of X on Y
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI
     -.0008      .1879     -.0041      .9967     -.3761      .3746

Indirect effect of X on Y
          Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI
tr_ch     -.1499      .0761     -.3355     -.0331

...................... ANALYSIS NOTES AND WARNINGS ........................
```